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INTRODUCTION 
Poison pills. Proxy access. Separation of the Chair and CEO positions. 
Staggered boards. Majority voting. Secret ballots. Independent directors. Say-
on-pay. How many battles have been fought over corporate governance 
reform? How much ink has been spilled over what the partisans present as 
burning issues? Each controversy is claimed to be important. Yet, in retrospect, 
or even from a contemporary disinterested perspective, the stakes hardly seem 
to justify the intensity of the contest. What could be going on? 
This is hardly an unusual situation. The material stakes in political disputes 
are often unrelated to the vigor of those contests. Often, even after high-profile, 
bitterly fought battles over policy, nothing changes. How is this 
phenomenon—a gap between rhetoric and reality, combined with minimal 
material stakes—to be understood, especially when it is so common as to be 
predictable? 
In this Article, we consider the possibility that corporate governance 
politics, like politics more generally, may have a significant “symbolic” 
element. When the stakes and the intensity are largely divorced from the 
specific issue being debated, one should ask whether politics is serving other 
functions, including a “mythological” or “ritual” function. In Part I, we review 
a selection of corporate governance controversies and show that they typically 
display a striking gap between rhetoric and reality, with small or zero material 
stakes. In Part II, we consider a variety of explanations for this gap. In doing 
so, we start with the familiar “public interest” and “public choice” analyses, 
and then introduce Thurman Arnold’s “symbolic” view of politics as 
developed in The Folklore of Capitalism. In Part III, we consider the 
implications of the symbolic aspects of corporate governance politics. We 
close with a brief conclusion. 
I. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONTROVERSIES 
An interesting feature of corporate governance politics is that there seem to 
be new controversies every year. Although there is a certain degree of 
uncertainty regarding the high-profile issues, there is significantly less 
uncertainty as to the prominent protagonists. The one sure thing is that we will 
never have a year without any controversies. It is almost enough to make one 
believe there is a corporate governance reform “industry” that demands 
activity to keep itself going. 
In this Part, we analyze four issues over which intense corporate governance 
disputes have recently arisen: poison pill proposals, proxy access, majority 
voting, and supermajority requirements. For each issue, we review the sharp 
rhetoric employed by the partisans and then explain why the actual stakes were 
small or trivial. We then consider, as a fifth issue, mandatory bylaw 
amendments, that—curiously—have not become a focus for activists even 
though such amendments could generate tangible changes. That shareholder 
activists and managerialists wage battles over issues of little import, while 
ignoring more meaningful issues, suggests that activism has a significant 
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“symbolic” element and cannot be fully explained by the material stakes at 
issue in a given controversy. 
A. Poison Pill Proposals 
1. The Issue 
One of the most common shareholder proposals asks boards to redeem a 
poison pill or to submit it to a shareholder vote. A 2000 shareholder proposal at 
Baxter International is typical: 
RESOLVED: The shareholders of Baxter International Inc. (“Company”) 
request that the Board of Directors redeem the stock purchase rights 
issued December 9, 1998, unless said issuance is approved by the 
affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding shares at a meeting of 
shareholders held as soon as practicable.1 
According to Georgeson, which compiles data on shareholder proposals 
filed in S&P 1500 firms, poison pill proposals were the most common type of 
governance proposal filed in the 1987 to 2004 period.2 These proposals also 
tend to garner substantial support from shareholders. During the 2000 proxy 
season, for example, the average poison pill rescission proposal was supported 
by 55% of the shares voted, with 39% voting against and 6% abstaining.3 
2. The Rhetoric 
Poison pills are widely regarded as the most formidable takeover defense. 
As long as a modern poison pill is in place, a company is virtually takeover-
proof.4 As explained by Marty Lipton, “[The poison pill] is an absolute bar to a 
 
1 Baxter Int’l Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 30 (Mar. 23, 2000), 
archived at http://perma.cc/DEV2-6LSE. 
2 See GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 2 fig.3 (2004), available 
at http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2004.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/A5VZ-FNEJ [hereinafter GEORGESON 2004] (data from 2001-2004); 
GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 3 fig.2 (2000), available at 
http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2000.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z6J6-FTBY [hereinafter GEORGESON 2000] (data from 1987-2000). Poison 
pill proposals started to decline as shareholder activism caused a reduction in outstanding 
pills. See GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 4, 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2007.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/R3KG-BXGN [hereinafter GEORGESON 2007]. 
3 See GEORGESON 2000, supra note 2, at 6 (documenting shareholder proposal voting 
results for the 2000 year). Additionally, in 2004, such proposals were supported by 60% of 
the shares that voted on the proposal, with 37% voting against and 3% abstaining. 
GEORGESON 2004, supra note 2, at 6 (documenting shareholder proposal election results for 
the 2004 year). 
4 See John C. Coates, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the 
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 321 n.195 (2000) (stating that poison pills prevent 
bidders who cannot win a proxy contest for the target from acquiring more than a small 
  
2000 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1997 
 
raider acquiring control . . . without the approval of the company’s board of 
directors.”5 
Because of this potency, governance professionals at major institutional 
investors view pills as illegitimate unless approved by shareholders. The State 
of Wisconsin Investment Board, for example, has a policy to “support 
shareholder proposals asking a company to submit its poison pill for 
shareholder ratification.”6 Vanguard’s proxy voting guidelines state that “[i]n 
general, shareholders should be afforded the opportunity to approve 
shareholder rights plans within a year of their adoption.”7 T. Rowe Price notes 
that “[w]e routinely vote against directors of any company that adopts a poison 
pill without subjecting it to shareholder approval, and we support shareholder 
proposals calling for companies to offer shareholders an opportunity to ratify 
their poison pills.”8 
Unsurprisingly, less-mainstream shareholder activists pick up on these 
themes. Thus, union activist UNITE HERE!,9 the shareholder proponent of the 
Baxter proposal (and holder of 10,400 of the company’s shares), argued that 
“shareholders should have the right to vote on the necessity of such a powerful 
tool that could be used to entrench existing management” and that “we do not 
believe that our Company should maintain its management and board- 
entrenching poison pill Rights Agreement without shareholder approval.”10 It 
concluded that “in light of . . . the undeniably undemocratic way in which they 
were assigned to shareholders, we believe these rights should lapse and not be 
extended, renewed or issued again without a shareholder vote.”11 
Boards take shareholder proposals to redeem poison pills seriously. Once 
such proposals received majority support, several companies let their poison 
pills expire.12 Without a poison pill, a company’s ability to resist a hostile 
takeover is substantially weakened. By inducing companies to let their poison 
 
percentage of target stock because they will be unable to redeem the pill). 
5 Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians 
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 859 n.4 (1993) (quoting Memorandum from Martin 
Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Clients (Jan. 15, 1993)). 
6 STATE OF WIS. INV. BD., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 17 (2014). 
7 Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, VANGUARD, archived at http://perma.cc/4GDP-
QXK9 (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).  
8 2013 Aggregate Proxy Voting Summary, T. ROWE PRICE, archived at 
http://perma.cc/85TG-48MJ (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).  
9 See generally UNITE HERE!, archived at http://perma.cc/SDR4-WVU4 (last visited Oct. 
16, 2014). 
10 Baxter Int’l Inc., supra note 1, at 31. 
11 Id. at 32.  
12 See Memorandum from David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen 
& Katz, Corporate Governance Update: Poison Pills – Maintain Flexibility in Takeover 
Defense 2-3 (2006) (stating that after a majority of affirmative votes to rescind poison pills, 
“[a] number of companies have simply allowed their rights plans to expire on schedule 
without renewing them”). 
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pills expire, it would seem that activists scored a major victory. 
3. The Reality 
The reality is that poison pill proposals, including proposals that induce 
companies to terminate or not to renew existing pills, have no impact on the 
company’s ability to resist a hostile bid. As any corporate lawyer worth her salt 
can tell you, it is both legally and practically irrelevant whether a company has 
a poison pill in place when a hostile bid is made. Poison pills are adopted 
unilaterally by a board and do not require any shareholder approval.13 If 
needed, a reasonably competent lawyer can implement a “rights plan”—the 
formal name for a pill—within a day.14 Hostile bids, by contrast, take time to 
consummate. The Williams Act15 requires that tender offers be left open for a 
period of at least twenty business days16 and mandates that any shareholder 
who acquires more than five percent of the company’s stock make a disclosure 
within ten days.17 This affords potential targets plenty of time to adopt a pill 
once a pill is needed.18 Raiders, of course, are just as aware of this fact as are 
the boards of potential targets. 
Terminating or failing to renew a pill does not represent an explicit or 
implicit commitment by the board not to adopt a pill in the future. In fact, even 
an announced board policy to forego a pill would not preclude a future board 
from adopting a pill if the future board believed that it was in the company’s 
best interest to do so.19 To properly bind a future board, the current board 
would have to add a charter provision limiting the board’s power to adopt a 
pill. But shareholder proposals on pills do not ask for such a provision. So why 
do shareholder activists push so hard for companies to remove the current pills 
but ignore the real issue that pills can be reinstated at any time? 
 
13 Coates, supra note 4, at 287 n.62 (“Technically, pill adoption is a dividend of rights to 
purchase stock. Dividends . . . are within the authority of the board and do not require 
shareholder approval.”). 
14 See KATZ & MCINTOSH, supra note 12, at 3 (“One great advantage of the poison 
pill . . . is that a board can adopt a pill very quickly – sometimes within 24 hours, and 
generally within a few days – if necessary.”). 
 15 Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968). 
16 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (2014). 
17 Id. at § 240.13d-1(a) (imposing filing requirement). 
18 KATZ & MCINTOSH, supra note 12, at 3 (stating that in 2005, 20% of pills were 
adopted in response to specific threat). 
19 See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-93 (Del. 1998) 
(holding that dead-hand pill violated Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law by depriving future board of responsibility for managing corporation). 
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B. Proxy Access 
1. The Issue 
Up to 2011, one of the most sought-after—and most fought-over—corporate 
governance reforms was proxy access. In 2003, the SEC released a proposal to 
grant shareholders access to a corporation’s proxy statement following a 
triggering event—either a thirty-five percent or more “withhold” vote in a 
director election or a majority vote by shareholders electing to make the 
company subject to proxy access.20 Under that proposal, after a trigger, 
shareholders of any publicly traded company who held at least five percent of 
the company’s stock for a minimum of two years would have been able to 
make nominations for some of the board seats.21 
Despite strong backing by shareholder activists and many institutional 
investors, the proposal was not adopted.22 Instead, in 2007, the SEC restricted 
 
20 See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,789 (proposed 
Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274) (proposal not adopted) 
(proposing to mandate shareholder access to the proxy statement when 35% or more votes 
during a direction election are withheld, or when a majority votes for such access). 
21 Id. 
22 The comments to Security Holder Director Nominations provide further information 
and show the breadth and vigor of the support for proxy access. See E-mail from Gabriel P. 
Caprio, Chief Exec. Officer, Amalgamated Bank, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 22, 
2003), archived at http://perma.cc/8ST6-TYV7 (stating the proposal “represents an 
important step toward meaningful reform of shareholder access rules”); Letter from Peter C. 
Clapman, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel, Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass’n of 
Am., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/M4XZ-
3BP3 (stating that the rule “would provide security holders with the ability to play a more 
direct and effective role in nominating and electing directors”); Letter from Gary Findlay, 
Exec. Dir., Mo. State Emps.’s Ret. Sys., et al., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 22, 
2003), archived at http://perma.cc/X2ZX-TCZK (stating that the proposed rules would give 
shareholders “the ability to participate meaningfully in board elections” for the first time); 
E-mail from Peter M. Gilbert, Chief Inv. Officer, Commonwealth of Pa. State Emps.’s Ret. 
Sys., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 22, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/K2WY-
EEYH (stating that the rules will “enable the shareholders, the true owners of the 
corporation, to hold boards of directors . . . more responsive”); Letter from Laurie Fiori 
Hacking, Exec. Dir., Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., to William H. Donaldson, Chair, SEC 
(Dec. 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/lfhacking121004.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/UX58-WHCD (calling the proposal “one of the most significant and 
important investor reforms adopted by the SEC since it adopted Rule 14a-8”); Letter from 
Sean Harrigan, President, Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 5, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-257.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4P43-HY2Z (stating the proposal “is perhaps the most significant reform to 
come as a result of the financial market crisis in the U.S.”); Letter from Alan G. Hevesi, 
Comptroller, N.Y., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s7-19-03-432.pdf, archived at 
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the ability of shareholders to seek proxy access on a company-by-company 
basis through a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8.23 
After the election of President Obama, the SEC’s composition—and its view 
on proxy access—changed again. In 2010, with the continued support of many 
 
http://perma.cc/E7EB-2NN7 (stating proxy access is of “critical importance” especially 
when considering recent corporate scandals); Letter from James P. Hoffa, Gen. President, 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-487.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/LVW3-AUD3 (stating that the proposal “is perhaps the single most 
important issue currently before the Commission and has the potential to produce true and 
lasting reform”); Letter from Henry H. Hopkins, Chief Legal Counsel, T. Rowe Price 
Assocs., Inc., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-385.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P9KV-2GX4 (suggesting modifications but asserting that overall, “the rule 
proposal strikes an appropriate balance between . . . right of shareholders to participate . . . 
and the potential for disruption”); E-mail from Keith Johnson, Chief Legal Counsel, State of 
Wis. Inv. Bd., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 22, 2003), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LP4X-9ECF (stating that the proposal will “improve the quality of director 
candidates through greater competition and attention to credentials”); Letter from Amy B.R. 
Lancellotta, Senior Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 22, 2003), 
archived at http://perma.cc/3Q36-MKE3 (providing commentary but “generally 
support[ing] the proposal”); Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, Int’l President, Am. Fed’n of 
State, Cnty. and Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Dec. 19, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-396.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/U8KM-3DX7 (stating that the proposal would “restor[e] accountability to 
our system of corporate governance”); Letter from Andrew G. Murphy, Vice President and 
Counsel, Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 15, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-364.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/SBJ9-5UTE (supporting the proposal “as a means of improving corporate 
governance, increased director accountability, independence, and performance”); Letter 
from Marsha D. Richter, Chief Exec. Officer, L.A. Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass’n, to William H. 
Donaldson, Chair, SEC (Dec. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-1016.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5CZN-D67N (asserting that “improving shareholder access to the proxy 
process is the most important corporate governance issue facing investors today”); Letter 
from William C. Thompson Jr., N.Y.C. Comptroller, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 
16, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/DN35-R3QZ (calling the proposal “one of the most 
significant actions taken to reform corporate governance and restore investor confidence”); 
Letter from Richard L. Trumka, Sec’y-Treasurer, Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. 
Org., to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 19, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/XA2Y-
UCLC (“[G]ranting long-term shareholders a meaningful say in picking directors is the most 
important investor reform to be considered by the Commission in decades.”). 
23 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2014); Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election 
of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56914 (Dec. 6, 2007), 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 
(Dec. 11, 2007); Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56160 (July 27, 
2007), 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466 (Aug. 3, 2007). 
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activists and institutional shareholders,24 it adopted a proxy access rule that 
 
24 The comments to the proposal provide further information and again demonstrate the 
breadth and intensity of the support expressed. See E-mail from Joseph A. Dear, Chief Inv. 
Officer, Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 14, 2009) 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-259.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZV8D-Z3LZ (calling the new rule “historically significant reform that will 
enable investor to hold corporate boards accountable and restore investor confidence in the 
capital markets”); Letter from Chris DeRose, Chief Exec. Officer, Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. 
Sys. to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-601.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SR67-
SGTB (commending the SEC for “fulfilling its role as the investor’s advocate by developing 
reforms to allow shareowner access to company-prepared proxy materials relating to the 
nomination and election of directors”); Letter from Jack Ehnes, Chief Exec. Officer, Cal. 
State Teachers Ret. Sys., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Jan. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-623.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8HH5-
GFMF (stating that “[p]roxy access will finally provide shareholders a meaningful voice in 
the nomination process and will be the greatest advancement of shareholder rights in 
decades”); Letter from Cornish F. Hitchcock, Counsel, Amalgamated Bank, to Elizabeth 
Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-
09/s71009-220.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8BM4-NVYJ (“[T]he current economic 
crisis has only underscored the need for shareholders to be able to hold directors 
accountable . . . by nominating candidates whose merits can be considered by all 
shareholders when they review the company-prepared proxy materials.”); Letter from James 
P. Hoffa, Gen. President, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Aug. 
17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-204.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7JC2-ZBBE (calling rules allowing shareholders to nominate board 
candidates “the most meaningful way to empower shareholders”); Letter from Mark R. 
Manley, Senior Vice President and Deputy Gen. Counsel, AllianceBernstein L.P., to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Aug. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-176.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S82K-
GNFA (supporting “the central problem that needs to be solved — shareholders’ limited 
ability to exercise their rights to nominate directors and have the nominations disclosed to 
and considered by shareholders”); Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, Int’l President, Am. 
Fed’n of State, Cnty. and Mun. Emps., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 3 (Jan. 19, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-613.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6K7A-88GE (“Shareholders need a uniform federal proxy access rule to 
facilitate their key state-law right to nominate and elect directors who will robustly represent 
their interests.”); Letter from Denise L. Nappier, Treasurer, Conn., to Elizabeth Murphy, 
Sec’y, SEC 1 (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-
607.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JVW7-6HBY (calling the proposal “an effective means 
of enhancing corporate boards’ accountability to shareholders and increasing investor 
confidence in our markets”); Letter from Theresa J. Whitmarsh, Exec. Officer, Wash. State 
Inv. Bd., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1 (Jan. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-594.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y47G-
WJBV (stating that “[r]arely has the need for the type of regulatory reform proposed by the 
SEC been more urgent”); Letter from Meredith Williams, Exec. Officer, Colo. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Ass’n, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Jan. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-612.pdf, archived at 
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went beyond the 2003 proposal: it removed the triggering event requirement 
and reduced the threshold for nominations to three percent held for three 
years.25 But even though Congress, as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, specifically 
authorized the SEC to regulate proxy access, the proxy access rule was struck 
down by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission.26 The court, however, left in place a 
companion rule that reversed the 2007 rule and specifically permitted 
shareholders to seek proxy access on a company-by-company basis through a 
shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8.27 
2. The Rhetoric 
From the SEC’s original proposal in 2003 through the invalidation of the 
SEC’s revised proxy access rule in 2011, proxy access elicited great 
controversy. To opponents, proxy access posed a clear and present danger to 
American prosperity. The Chamber of Commerce included killing proxy 
access among its top five priorities;28 SEC Commissioner Casey thought it was 
“fatally flawed”;29 two Wachtell lawyers feared it would “wreak havoc with 
American business”;30 and Willkie Farr & Gallagher thought it would have a 
“profound effect on the election of corporate directors.”31 
Proponents adopted equally strong rhetoric in the other direction.32 CtW 
 
http://perma.cc/N5HN-5GSL (stating that “[a]mending proxy access rules will provide for 
the exercise of shareowners’ fundamental rights to nominate and elect directors”).  
25 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,680, 56,688 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (vacated before 
publication).  
26 647 F.3d 1144, 1149-51 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that because the SEC did not 
adequately address the rule’s economic effects, the rule was “arbitrary and capricious”).  
27 See id. at 1153 & n.** (explaining that rule 14a-8 is “not challenged here”). 
28 See Kara Scannell, Proxy Plan Roils Talks on Finance Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 
2010, at A2 (“Now, the Chamber is mobilizing forces to lobby lawmakers to kill the 
provision.”). 
29 Kathleen Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt Amendments 
Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Aug. 25, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4HQT-44QK. 
30 David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Senate Bill Adversely Affects the Landscape, 243 
N.Y. L.J., May 27, 2010, at 5; see also Martin Lipton, Briefly, AEI Legal Center for the 
Public Interest, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2008, at 6 (2008) (calling proxy 
access “a serious mistake with far-reaching consequences”). 
31 Memorandum from Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP, SEC Proposes “Proxy Access” 
Rules to Facilitate Director Nominations by Shareholders (Aug. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2010/08/SEC%20Adopts%20Proxy%20
Access%20Rules%20To%20Facilitate%20Dire__/Files/SECAdoptsProxyAccessRulespdf/F
ileAttachment/SEC-Adopts-Proxy-Access-Rules.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4TQ3-
TGM8. 
32 See supra note 24. 
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Investment Group, a proxy advisory firm, called proxy access a “new and 
powerful tool”;33 the Council of Institutional Investors thought it was 
“groundbreaking for U.S. shareowners”;34 SEC Commissioner Walters felt it 
would “restore investor confidence”;35 Commissioner Goldschmid worried 
that, without proxy access, shareholders would remain “marginalized in 
choosing the direction of boards”;36 and the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System regarded “[p]roxy access [as] one of our top priorities.”37 
3. The Reality 
The 2012 proxy season was the first time that shareholder activists had a 
clear opportunity to seek implementation of proxy access through a 
shareholder proposal. The SEC rules that had been unclear—prior to 2007—or 
had been clear in not permitting such proposals—between 2007 and 2011—
had been revised.38 Moreover, in the meantime, Delaware modified its law to 
clarify that proxy access could be validly implemented via a bylaw 
amendment.39 This presented the possibility of passing a “mandatory” Rule 
14a-8 proposal that directly amends the bylaws to grant proxy access (rather 
than merely requesting that the board take steps to implement proxy access). 
Finally, by 2012, it was clear that the SEC would not take up “proxy access” in 
the near future.40 
Viewed from this perspective, when the SEC’s proxy access rule was 
invalidated in Business Roundtable, shareholder activists had merely lost a 
battle, not the war. To be sure, the battleground had shifted to the ballot box, 
 
33 Joann S. Lublin, New Rule on Proxies Puts Heat on Firms, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 
2010, at B1. 
34 Walter Hamilton, SEC Expands Access to ‘Proxy’ Process; Major Stockholders Will 
be Able to Place Board Nominees Directly on the Ballot, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at B1. 
35 Walter Calls for Action on Proxy Access, Disclosure, Other Governance Topics, 
BLOOMBERG BNA CORP. LAW DAILY, Feb. 19, 2009 (attributing phrase to SEC 
Commissioner Elisse Walter). 
36 Richard Hill, Goldschmid Says Shareholders Need Voice In Choosing Direction of 
Company’s Board, BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP., Mar. 15, 2004, available at 36 
SRLR 483. 
37 Press Release, Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., CalPERS Responds to Appeals Court 
Decision in Proxy Access Case (July 22, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/YPH9-X7R2.  
38 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014) (clarifying when a company must include a 
shareholder proposal and listing specific circumstances when company can exclude 
proposal). 
39 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2011) (establishing that companies “may be 
required, to the extent and subject to such procedures or conditions as may be provided in 
the bylaws, to include in its proxy solicitation materials . . . 1 or more individuals nominated 
by a stockholder”). 
40 Press Release, Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement on Proxy Access 
Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/9S6H-VLEJ (stating that the SEC 
would not appeal the D.C. Circuit’s decision to vacate Rule 14a-11). 
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but the investor community had been sensitized to, and had given significant 
support to some version of, proxy access. Thus, activists had reason to be 
optimistic over how a proxy access shareholder proposal would fare. Surely 
they would avail themselves of the opportunity to pressure companies to 
implement proxy access—their long-sought and critically important 
governance reform—through actual or threatened 14a-8 proposals. 
So what happened on the proxy access front in 2012? Not much. U.S.-based 
institutional investors, many of which had been strong advocates of the SEC 
proposal, submitted a total of three proxy access proposals: at Hewlett-Packard 
(submitted by Amalgamated Bank), at Chesapeake Energy (by New York City 
pension funds), and at Nabors Industries (by a group of pension funds).41 
Several individual shareholders and the Norway-based Norges Bank submitted 
another twenty proposals.42 Of these, however, eight were omitted because 
they failed to comply with SEC rules, and one was not presented at the 
meeting.43 As tabulated by Georgeson, proxy access was only the tenth most 
common type of shareholder proposal (with six entries among the S&P 1500) 
and only about half as common as the ninth (cumulative voting, with eleven 
entries).44 
Perhaps activists feared that the overall shareholder support for proxy access 
was not, in fact, high. So once they lost the political battle to obtain proxy 
access through a SEC rule, they did not even bother to fight the battle to obtain 
proxy access through the ballot. 
We do not think so. In the few companies where proxy access shareholder 
proposals came to a vote, they did reasonably well. Of the twelve proposals for 
which we could obtain data, six were supported by ISS, the most influential 
proxy advisor.45 Although the proposals made by individual shareholders, 
which tended to grant proxy access to a very wide group of shareholders, fared 
poorly, the four proposals by Norges Bank garnered twenty-five to thirty 
percent of the votes including abstentions (thirty to thirty-nine percent of the 
votes excluding abstentions), a reasonably successful result for 14a-8 
proposals.46 Importantly, the Norges Bank proposal went substantially beyond 
the SEC rule by granting proxy access to holders who held a minimum of one 
 
41 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, PROXY ACCESS PROPOSALS – REVIEW OF 2012 
RESULTS AND OUTLOOK FOR 2013, at 2 (2012) (summarizing all 2012 proxy access 
proposals). 
42 Id. (detailing the proponent and specifics of each proposal). 
43 Id. (stating the reasons for each exclusion). 
44 See GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 18 (2012), available at 
http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2012.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/A2N5-7CJV [hereinafter GEORGESON 2012] (listing corporate governance 
proposals for selected proposals from 2012, including for the “Cumulative Voting” and 
“Adopt Proxy Access” proposal types). 
45 Id. at 7 (stating that ISS recommended six of the proposals). 
46 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 41, at 2, 7 (listing voting figures for 
proxy access proposals and discussing why they failed). 
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percent of the company’s stock for a one-year period (as opposed to three 
percent for three years).47 
Most importantly, however, the three proposals made by U.S.-based 
institutional investors, which resembled the SEC rule, did extraordinarily well. 
The two proposals that came up for a vote were adopted by a majority of the 
shareholder vote.48 The third proposal, at Hewlett-Packard, was withdrawn 
after the company agreed to recommend a proxy access proposal that would be 
submitted for a vote by shareholders at the 2013 annual meeting,49 where it 
was approved by an overwhelming majority.50 
The success of the 2012 proposals did not embolden institutions to propose 
proxy access in the 2013 season. According to Georgeson, only eleven 
shareholder proposals on proxy access came up for a vote in 2013.51 Other than 
Norges Bank (which submitted three proposals), institutional investors 
remained largely on the sidelines.52 As in 2012, the proposals that resembled 
the SEC rule fared well.53 Three of five such proposals received more “for” 
than “against” votes,54 and a fourth received forty percent support.55 In 
addition to Hewlett-Packard, Chesapeake Energy also submitted its own 
proposal on proxy access, which was supported by over ninety-five percent of 
the shares voted.56 
 
47 See id. at 1-2. 
48 See id. at 1 (showing that the Chesapeake Energy proposal received 59% of the vote 
and the Nabors Industries proposal received 56% of the vote). 
49 See Joann S. Lublin & Ben Worthen, H-P Activist Investors Score a Major Victory, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2012, at B4.  
50 See Hewlett-Packard Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 42 (Feb. 1, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/3LR5-PGVD (detailing the specifics of the proposal); 
Hewlett-Packard Co., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (Mar. 20, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/CU8M-VR9F (detailing that the proposal received over 1,331 million votes 
for, and only 40 million votes against). 
51 See GEORGESON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 22 (2013) [hereinafter 
GEORGESON 2013], available at http://www.computershare-
na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QC8H-GCX3. 
52 See id. at 30 (showing that primarily non-institutional investors submitted proposals). 
53 See id. at 11 (stating proxy access proposals that mirrored the SEC approach averaged 
53% of votes cast). 
54 The proposals were made at Verizon, CenturyLink, and Nabors. See id. at 10-11, 30 
fig.14 (showing the specific voting percentages for each proposal). The total number of 
proposals that resembled the SEC rule—five—is compiled using both Georgeson Report 
figures (reflecting four such proposals) and the 2013 SEC filing for Microwave Filter (the 
fifth proposal). See Microwave Filter, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (March 4, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6GU3-X26Y. 
55 The proposal was made at Walt Disney. See GEORGESON 2013, supra note 51, at 30 
fig.14 (showing that the proposal also received votes of 30% of outstanding stock). 
56 The proposal nevertheless was not adopted because adoption required the support of 
two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote. See id. at 11. As in 2012, none of the seven 2013 
  
2014] SYMBOLIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLITICS 2009 
 
What explains, then, why shareholder activists made such a strong push to 
get proxy access adopted by the SEC, but then failed to lift a finger to get it 
adopted through shareholder resolutions? In an earlier article, we argued that 
proxy access would have had only a trivial impact on corporate governance.57 
Most importantly, we argued that proxy access would result in only small cost 
savings for challengers while creating substantial strategic disadvantages. Any 
challenger serious about obtaining board representation would thus be unlikely 
to use proxy access instead of waging a traditional contest. 
Conceivably, activists read our article and realized that they had, for the 
prior decade, focused their energy on the wrong reform. As much as we would 
like to believe that, we doubt it is true. Why, then, did they suddenly lose 
interest in proxy access? 
C. Majority Voting 
1. The Issue 
The traditional voting standard, which applies as a default rule in Delaware 
and most other states, is that directors are elected by a plurality of the votes 
cast.58 The problem with the traditional plurality standard is that it has little 
meaning in uncontested elections, as most board elections are. If the number of 
nominees to the board is equal to the number of board seats to be filled, any 
nominee who receives even one vote is elected.59 As a result, a nominee can be 
elected even if the vast majority of shareholders are opposed. 
In response, beginning in 2005 (and continuing to the present), shareholder 
activists began to push for changes in the voting standard. Initially, the 
plurality standard was often supplemented by a board policy requiring each 
member or board nominee to submit a conditional offer to resign if the director 
did not receive a majority of the votes cast at the next election.60 As activists 
 
proposals that had more liberal thresholds for nominations garnered a majority, though those 
submitted by Norges obtained approximately one-third of the affirmative votes. See id. at 
10-11, 30 (showing that outside of the Norges proposals, these proposals averaged 8.8% of 
votes cast). The seven proposals were made at Bank of America, iRobot, Goldman Sachs, 
Staples, Netflix, Charles Schwab, and CME Group. See id. at 30 fig.14 (listing the voting 
numbers both as a percent of votes cast and as a percent of outstanding shares). 
57 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 1347, 1347-48 (2011) [hereinafter Insignificance] (discussing the authors’ view that 
proxy access would likely entail significant disadvantages while giving only modest 
benefits).  
58 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2011) (stating that in the absence of specification, 
“[d]irectors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares . . . ”). 
59 See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS, at ii 
(2007), available at 
http://www.ngelaw.com/files/uploads/documents/majoritystudy111207.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H936-Z7N2. 
60 See id. (discussing how in 2005 and 2006, many companies kept plurality voting in 
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were still not satisfied, many companies amended their bylaws or their 
certificates of incorporation to adopt a majority standard for election.61 The 
Council of Institutional Investors identifies majority voting as a priority and 
has recently pushed Delaware, the NYSE and NASDAQ to adopt it as either a 
mandatory rule or default rule for uncontested elections.62 
2. The Rhetoric 
For shareholder activists, majority voting is a dream issue. The traditional 
plurality system, in which it is theoretically possible for a director to be elected 
by a single vote against the overwhelming opposition of shareholders, offends 
basic notions of “shareholder democracy.” Elections with plurality voting were 
described as “rubber stamp elections . . . [that] are unlikely to shape director 
behavior in favor of long-term shareholders.”63 Though plurality voting is 
commonly employed in the United States, including in Congressional races, 
arguments against it were filled with references to elections in the old Soviet 
Union: 
Investors may think they live in the United States of America, but when it 
comes to electing corporate directors—shareholders’ intended watchdogs 
in the boardrooms—they are definitely back in the U.S.S.R. Even sadder 
to say, some of the nation’s biggest mutual funds are helping to keep 
them there.64 
Activists also promised that a shift to majority voting would genuinely 
empower shareholders: 
“Director accountability is the hallmark of good governance,” said Dr. 
Martha Carter, ISS’ director of U.S. Research. “The board election 
process must ensure that shareholders’ expressions of dissatisfaction with 
the performance of directors have meaningful consequences. A majority 
vote standard transforms the director election process from a symbolic 
 
place but adopted detailed resignation policies for when directors did not get a majority). 
61 Malina Manickavasagam, Updated Study Shows More Companies Shifting to Binding 
Majority Vote Standard, BLOOMBERG BNA CORP. LAW DAILY, Nov. 30, 2007 (“[F]or the 
first time . . . more large public companies are adopting binding provisions, not merely 
policies, to base their director election standard on a majority rather than plurality 
vote. . . .”). 
62 See Majority Voting for Directors, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, 
http://perma.cc/8BXY-AQTY (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (providing correspondences of 
the Council of Institutional Investors petitions to NYSE, NASDAQ, and the DE Bar 
Association). 
63 E-mail from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to John 
Carey, Vice President – Legal, NYSE (June 20, 2013) (on file with Boston University Law 
Review). 
64 Gretchen Morgenson, Who’s Afraid of Shareholder Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2005, § 3, at 1. The real parallel between board elections and the Soviet Union is not 
plurality voting, but instead, the lack of competitive races. 
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gesture to a meaningful voice for shareholders.”65 
Opponents were equally engaged and argued that a shift from plurality to 
majority voting would threaten significant negative consequences: 
Majority voting would give special-interest shareholder activists 
increased opportunity to pursue their particular objectives, in many cases 
to the detriment of other shareholders and the company as a whole. 
Activists would gain leverage from the ability to defeat a director 
nominee even if withheld votes constituted substantially less than a 
majority of the outstanding shares. Moreover, the functioning of the 
board would be disrupted if a key director did not win re-election; if the 
board had to function for a period of time without a full complement of 
members; or if top director candidates were deterred from participation by 
the potential embarrassment and reputational effects of “losing” an 
election.66 
3. The Reality 
Once shareholder activists highlighted the undemocratic features of the 
plurality election system, the system began to collapse. Large companies 
quickly moved to change the voting rules governing the election of directors. 
Within less than two years, between February 2006 and November 2007, half 
of the S&P 500 companies moved from plurality voting to some form of 
majority voting.67 For smaller companies, however, the pace of change has 
been slower; by 2012, only fifty-two percent of midcap and nineteen percent of 
small-cap companies had adopted majority voting.68 
 
65 Institutional Shareholder Services Takes Stand on Majority Vote Standard, PRN 
NEWSWIRE US, Mar. 11, 2005, archived at http://perma.cc/M7AX-R49X. See also STEPHEN 
DEANE, THE ISS INST. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS: 
FROM THE SYMBOLIC TO THE DEMOCRATIC 2 (2005), available at 
http://maga.econ.msu.ru/Work/%D0%A1%D0%A8%D0%90%20-
%20Presentations/Majority_Voting_White_Paper.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5RSZ-
6Z5W (explaining path forward regarding for majority voting). The Council of Institutional 
Investors proposed amending the Delaware General Corporate Law to make majority voting 
the default setting and sounded similar themes: “The benefits of a majority vote standard are 
many: it democratizes the corporate electoral process; it puts real voting power in the hands 
of investors with minimal disruption to corporate affairs; and it makes boards’ more 
representative of, and accountable to, shareowners.” Letter from Council of Institutional 
Investors to the Del. Bar Assoc. Section on Corporate Law (Aug. 11, 2011) (on file with the 
Boston University Law Review). 
66 David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance: Majority Election of 
Directors, N.Y. L.J. ONLINE, Mar. 24, 2005.  
67 See Allen, supra note 59, at i (finding that from February 2006 to November 2007, the 
percentage of S&P 500 companies with majority voting increased from 16% to 66%). 
68 See E-mail from Jeff Mahoney, supra note 63, at 3 (stating that from 2007 to 2012, the 
small-cap percentage grew from 7% to 17% and the mid-cap percentage grew from 18% to 
52%). 
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We do not claim that a move from a plurality standard to a majority regime 
is meaningless. We do claim, however, that the “problem” of powerless 
shareholders under the plurality standard is not so big; that the solutions 
generated by the offer-to-resign policy and the majority standard do not 
empower shareholders all that much; and that the plurality standard has certain 
advantages over a majority regime. The net effect of a move from one standard 
to another is, in our assessment, small. 
Consider first the “problem” generated by the plurality standard. To keep 
the problem in perspective, it is important to note that the vast majority of 
director nominees in uncontested elections are elected with a majority—in fact, 
usually well over a majority—of the votes cast. For example, in the 2009 proxy 
season, only eighty-two director nominees for a Russell 3000 company failed 
to receive more “for” than “withhold” or “against” votes; in the 2008 season, 
the respective number was thirty-one.69 Thus, the difference in voting 
standards affects only a small number of nominees each year. 
Second, significant withhold votes—even if far short of a majority—are 
regarded as an embarrassment and often result in some corporate response. For 
example, after Disney CEO Michael Eisner received a substantial—but less 
than majority—withhold vote, he was immediately ousted as Chairman of the 
Board and terminated as CEO the following year.70 
Third, responses are usually forthcoming for nominees that receive a 
majority of withhold votes even if the company at issue subscribes to the 
traditional plurality standard for election. In an earlier study, we found that for 
about seventy percent of directors who received majority withhold votes, the 
company’s response—usually within one year of the vote—was deemed 
satisfactory by shareholders.71 For example, when the high withhold vote is 
due to the board adopting a poison pill or to a director not being sufficiently 
independent due to business relations with the company, the company may 
then repeal the pill or the director may terminate the business relationship. 
When this occurs, the director will typically be re-elected the following year 
with a clear majority. In most of these cases, however, the company’s response 
does not take the form of pressuring the director to resign or not re-nominating 
her.72 
In sum, majority withhold votes are rare events. If they happen, they usually 
result in change in policy even under a plurality standard; but, for companies 
with a plurality standard, they rarely result in a change in the board. 
 
69 See Insignificance, supra note 57, at 1420 (reporting number of directors who failed to 
receive majority “for” votes). 
70 See id. at 1359.  
71 Id. at 1421 (finding that a satisfactory company response occurred in 67 of the 98 
majority withhold votes from 2008 and 2009 where the nominee did not leave within a year 
and where the company was not acquired or about to be acquired by the next annual 
meeting). 
72 See id. at 1423 (detailing company responses to majority withhold votes). 
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To see how a majority regime affects this “problem,” we start by examining 
the direct effect of the different standards for a nominee who failed to receive 
majority support. Under the plurality standard, the nominee is elected. Under 
the offer-to-resign policy, the nominee is also elected, but the other board 
members can accept (or not accept) her offer to resign. In other words, it is up 
to the other board members to decide whether or not the nominee retains her 
board seat. 
Under the majority standard, the nominee is not elected. However, under the 
law of Delaware and other states, a director serves until her successor is 
elected or until she resigns or is removed.73 If the nominee is already a board 
member, she will thus retain her seat for the time being until she either resigns 
or the board elects someone else to the quasi-vacant seat. The board, of course, 
may not act at all or could appoint the very nominee who failed to receive a 
majority shareholder vote to fill the vacancy generated by her non-election. In 
other words, just as in the offer-to-resign policy, it is up to the other board 
members whether the nominee retains her board seat. From this vantage point, 
the offer-to-resign policy and the majority standard are equivalent, and 
different from the plurality standard. 
But the plurality standard is not as different as it appears. Though the other 
board members cannot force a nominee who is validly elected to resign, they 
can put significant pressure on her and, of course, they can refuse to 
renominate her when her term is up. As a practical matter, even under the 
plurality standard, the other board members have significant influence over 
whether the nominee retains her board seat and ultimately control over how 
long she does so. 
To be sure, the description of the direct legal effect of the different standards 
does not do full justice to the actual differences. A board will likely be more 
reluctant to appoint a nominee who failed to receive a majority vote under a 
majority standard to the vacancy created by her non-election than to reject the 
offer to resign of a nominee who failed to receive a majority vote under an 
offer-to-resign policy. Similarly, boards will likely be more reluctant to reject 
an offer to resign than to fail to pressure a nominee to resign on her own 
accord. Thus, as a practical matter, a majority withhold vote is more likely to 
result in a change in board composition under a majority voting regime than 
under plurality voting. 
But the different reaction of a board to a majority withhold vote may reflect 
the fact that withhold votes send a different message depending on the 
applicable voting standard. On one hand, a majority withhold vote, when a 
company subscribes to a plurality standard, asks the company to fix some 
problem but conveys the message that it is alright to keep the director on the 
board if the problem is fixed. In our study, we found that when the board fixed 
 
73 E.g., Del. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2011) (“Each director shall hold office until such 
director’s successor is elected and qualified or until such director’s earlier resignation or 
removal.”). 
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the problem that accounted for the majority withhold vote under plurality 
voting, the director who received the majority withhold vote gained large 
shareholder support at the next election.74 Shareholders, in other words, did not 
mind the fact that the director did not resign as long as the problems were 
fixed. On the other hand, a majority withhold vote, when a company subscribes 
to a majority standard, sends the board a stronger message to get rid of the 
director. It would thus be wrong to look at the consequences of a majority 
withhold vote under a plurality standard and conclude that the plurality 
standard is deficient because most directors who receive a majority withhold 
vote retain their seats. 
Any individual company, of course, can only have one voting standard for 
the election of directors. From a governance perspective, therefore, there is a 
choice of which type of message shareholders want to be able to send. It would 
be reasonable for shareholders to prefer a plurality standard because they think 
that being able to send the message to fix a problem is more important—
because they care more about fixing the underlying problem than changing the 
board composition; because the issue may arise more frequently; or because it 
may be easier to garner a majority withhold vote under a plurality standard 
than under a majority standard. It would also be reasonable for shareholders to 
prefer a majority standard because it is more likely to result in the actual ouster 
of a director or to deter directors from taking actions that may result in high 
withhold votes. 
One possible interpretation of the push by shareholder activists for a 
majority standard, and the quick and widespread success they have attained, is 
that it reflects a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of both 
regimes and a conscious choice that the advantages of majority voting 
outweigh the disadvantages. This is possible, though the differences between 
messages sent under the different voting standards would not seem to warrant 
either the highly charged rhetoric summarized above or the speed of the 
change in standards. Are there more plausible explanations for why activists 
push for a majority voting standard, why boards have overwhelmingly given in 
without a fight, and why a pillar of Delaware corporate law like former Chief 
Justice Norman Veasey proposed a version of majority voting?75 
D. Supermajority Shareholder Proposals 
1. The Issue 
Under state law, certificates of incorporation can generally be amended if 
the board recommends an amendment and the amendment is approved by the 
 
74 See Insignificance, supra note 57, at 1420-21 (examining the ISS voting 
recommendations, which state the reason for the withhold recommendation, and finding the 
directors were easily re-elected if the company took actions to address the relevant concern).  
75 A description of Chief Judge Veasey’s role and views are available in Deane, supra 
note 65, at 6-7, 9-10, 18, vii n.20, vii n.25, viii n.29, & viii n.31. 
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vote of a majority of the shares entitled to vote.76 Likewise, mergers generally 
require a board recommendation and approval by a majority of the shares 
entitled to vote.77 As noted above, bylaws can be amended by a vote of a 
majority of shares.78 State law, however, permits companies to impose higher 
voting thresholds for shareholder approval.79 Some companies have availed 
themselves of this opportunity and provided that some provisions in the charter 
or the bylaws can be changed only with the vote of a supermajority of shares. 
Shareholder activists have recently started to focus on these supermajority 
provisions. Lately, Standard and Poor 1500 companies have voted on between 
ten to twenty such proposals a year, making elimination of the supermajority 
voting requirement one of the most common corporate governance proposals.80 
Proposals to eliminate supermajority voting are also amongst the ones that 
obtain the highest level of shareholder support.81 
 
76 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2011) (stating amendments are approved 
if a majority of the outstanding stock in each class entitled to vote votes in favor of the 
amendment); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 10.03(e) (2002) (stating amendments are approved 
upon “approval of the shareholders at a meeting at which a quorum consisting of at least a 
majority of the votes entitled to be cast on the amendment exists”).  
77 See, e.g., tit. 8, § 251(b), (c) (stating in subsection (b) the procedures for board 
recommendation and in subsection (c) the procedures for shareholder approval); Model Bus. 
Corp. Act § 11.04(e) (stating the procedures for shareholder approval of a merger, requiring 
a majority of the shares entitled to vote). 
78 See, e.g., tit. 8, § 109(a) (stating simply that bylaws may be amended, adopted, or 
repealed by the stockholders); id. § 216(1) (“In all matters other than the election of 
directors, the affirmative vote of the majority of shares present in person or represented by 
proxy . . . shall be the act of the stockholders. . . .”); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.25(c) (“If a 
quorum exists, action on a matter . . . by a voting group is approved if the votes cast within 
the voting group favoring the action exceed the votes cast opposing the action . . . .”). 
79 See, e.g., tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (stating the certificate of incorporation may contain 
provisions requiring a vote of a larger portion of the stock or of any class or series for any 
corporate action); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.27 (“The articles of incorporation may provide 
for a greater quorum or voting requirement for shareholders . . . than is provided for by this 
Act.”). 
80 See GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 14 (2008), available at 
http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2008.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P58V-GVYG [hereinafter GEORGESON 2008] (showing that eleven proposals 
related to supermajority provisions were voted on in 2008). Elimination or reduction of 
supermajority voting provisions has been one of the ten most common corporate governance 
proposals voted on over the five-year period 2008-2012. GEORGESON 2012, supra note 44, 
at 12 (showing that supermajority provisions ranged between 3.2% and 8.5% of all 
corporate governance proposals voted on in these years). In 2012, it was the sixth most 
common proposal. Id. (showing that fourteen supermajority-related proposals were voted on 
in that year). Since many companies do not have any supermajority requirements that can be 
eliminated, the incidence of such proposals on the relevant subset of companies with such 
requirements is much higher. 
81 See GEORGESON 2012, supra note 44, at 18-19 (showing that these proposals received 
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2. The Rhetoric 
Shareholder activists view elimination of supermajority provisions as highly 
important. As recently argued in a supporting statement, 
Corporate governance procedures and practices, and the level of 
accountability they impose, are closely related to financial performance. 
Shareowners are willing to pay a premium for shares of corporations that 
have excellent corporate governance. Supermajority voting requirements 
have been found to be one of six entrenching mechanisms that are 
negatively related with company performance. . . . If our Company were 
to remove required supermajority, it would be a strong statement that our 
Company is committed to good corporate governance and its long-term 
financial performance.82 
Supporters of such provisions, including companies faced with such 
proposals, are equally certain that supermajority provisions are necessary to 
protect minority shareholders against coercion and oppression by the majority. 
Google, for example, justified its supermajority requirements as ensuring that 
“fundamental changes to the organizational document of the company only 
occur with a broader consensus than a simple majority.”83 
3. The Reality 
Whether supermajority voting requirements matter depends on what 
substantive provisions are entrenched by these requirements. Some charters 
impose supermajority requirements on shareholders’ ability to remove 
directors without cause or to amend the bylaws or entrench staggered boards. 
These provisions could have a plausible impact on corporate governance 
because staggered boards can impede hostile takeovers and shareholders may 
seek bylaw amendments to, for example, establish proxy access or separate the 
positions of Chairman of the Board and CEO. 
In other cases, however, some or all of the substantive provisions protected 
 
62-73% of the votes on average between 2008 and 2012). In the five-year period 2008-2012, 
proposals to eliminate or reduce supermajority voting provisions were within the top three 
most supported proposal types tracked by Georgeson. Id. For example, in 2012, these 
proposals, on average, received 69% of votes cast. Id. at 18.  
82 Netflix, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 22 (Apr. 20, 2011) 
(citation omitted), archived at http://perma.cc/XZ75-T6QQ.  
83 Google Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 68 (Apr. 20, 2011), 
archived at http://perma.cc/5GBW-KYMF. As another example, in recommending 
shareholders vote against a proposal to eliminate supermajority voting, the Kellogg Board 
stated that supermajority votes “[give] minority shareowners a greater voice in corporate 
structure and governance.” Kellogg Company, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), 
at 69 (Mar. 5, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/7LWG-GG8D; see also PACCAR Inc., 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 41 (Mar. 10, 2011) (“The . . . supermajority 
vote provisions are designed to protect all PACCAR shareholders against coercive takeover 
tactics . . . .”). 
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by a supermajority vote against amendment are of extremely remote relevance. 
Consider, for example, Eastman Chemical Company, which received a 
shareholder proposal to eliminate supermajority vote requirements in the 2011 
proxy season.84 At the time, the company’s charter required a supermajority for 
shareholders to remove directors for cause and to amend the bylaws.85 For-
cause removals at public companies are virtually unheard of, and the likelihood 
that anyone would seek to remove a director for cause and receive a majority 
but less than two-thirds shareholder support is very low. 
Perhaps the Eastman Chemical proposal was really aimed at the 
supermajority requirement for bylaw amendments and just painted with a 
broad brush. But then consider Ecolab Inc., which also received a shareholder 
proposal to eliminate supermajority vote requirements in the 2011 proxy 
season. The substantive provision at issue was a “fair price” anti-takeover 
charter provision that required supermajority shareholder approval for certain 
“business combinations” with an “interested shareholder” unless the 
transaction was approved by a majority of the directors not affiliated with the 
interested shareholder or met certain “fair price” and procedural 
requirements.86 Today, this sort of “fair price” provision is irrelevant because 
boards can use poison pills to ward off any unwanted bidders. In the end, the 
shareholder resolution was approved, the board proposed the requisite 
amendment the following year, and the charter was amended to eliminate the 
fair price provision.87 
A similar proposal the same year called for Sprint Nextel to remove any 
supermajority voting requirements in its charter and bylaws and opt out of any 
such requirements imposed by state law (without specifying whether state law 
imposed such requirements).88 As in the case of Ecolab, the only supermajority 
voting requirements at issue appeared to be a “fair price” anti-takeover charter 
provision.89 The proposal passed and, the following year, the board 
recommended removing the fair price provision from the charter and, for good 
measure, opting out of the Kansas anti-takeover statute.90 Again, none of this 
mattered as Sprint Nextel has access to a poison pill. Since Sprint Nextel does 
 
84 Eastman Chem. Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 55 (Mar. 18, 
2011). 
85 Id. at 56.  
86 Ecolab Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 77 (Mar. 21, 2011), 
archived at http://perma.cc/RR7H-ABGB (stating that the board unanimously disapproved 
of the proposal). 
87 Ecolab Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (May 4, 2012) (stating that the 
shareholders approved the amendment). 
88 Sprint Nextel Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 68 (Mar. 28, 
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/E79A-XGFX (stating the board believed this proposal to 
be unnecessary and against the company’s best interests). 
89 Id. at 69. 
90 Sprint Nextel Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 52 (Apr. 5, 2012) 
(stating the board was proposing to establish majority voting for all matters). 
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not have a staggered board, any of these defenses—the pill, the anti-takeover 
statute, and the fair price charter provision—could be overcome by the simple 
(and, in hostile bids, common) ploy of seeking to replace the board while a 
hostile tender offer is pending. 
Given the irrelevance of supermajority provisions and of shareholder 
proposals to eliminate those provisions, why do shareholders bring such 
proposals and why do managers resist? 
E. The Scarcity of Mandatory Proposals 
One of the shareholder proposals that received the most attention during the 
2013 proxy season was the resolution, introduced by the AFSCME Employees 
Pension Plan, to separate the role of CEO and Chairman of the Board at 
JPMorgan Chase.91 The target of the proposal was JPMorgan’s high-profile 
CEO and Chairman Jamie Dimon.92 Dimon had received plaudits for steering 
his company relatively unscathed through the financial crisis,93 but more 
recently had been criticized for his handling of the “London Whale,” who 
accumulated over $6 billion in trading losses for the bank.94 In the closing days 
of the voting period, with several institutional investors still making up their 
minds on how to vote, Dimon suggested that he might resign if the proposal 
were adopted, a comment interpreted by some as a threat.95 
Proposals like AFSCME’s can be introduced either as precatory resolutions 
or as mandatory bylaw amendments. Precatory proposals, of course, are non-
binding. Boards are at liberty to ignore them. Although boards pay much more 
attention to precatory resolutions than they used to, a significant percentage are 
not implemented.96 Other types of proposals that can usually be introduced as 
mandatory bylaw amendments97 are proposals on confidential voting; 
 
91 See Christine Harper et al., JPMorgan Holders Led by Chairmen-CEOs to Vote on 
Dimon, BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2013, 12:00 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/W57V-5ACA 
(observing that most of the company’s biggest shareholders were run by officers with the 
same dual role). 
92 See id. 
93 See, e.g., Halah Touryalai, JPMorgan Directors to Shareholders: Don’t Fire Us, Let 
Dimon Keep Chairman Job, FORBES (May 10, 2013, 3:00 PM), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DE6W-2VDJ (stating that under Mr. Dimon’s leadership the bank did not 
have a single quarterly loss during the financial crisis). 
94 See Jake Zamansky, JPMorgan Fails to Turn Its “London Whale” Into Scapegoat, 
FORBES (Mar. 15, 2013, 11:45 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/K8ML-BRKG. 
95 See Eleanor Bloxham, J.P. Morgan’s Doubtful Dimon Defense, FORTUNE (May 16, 
2013, 5:23 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/9PHJ-F6X4; Touryalai, supra note 93.  
96 See id. at 1012-13 (stating that although the share of precatory resolutions 
implemented by boards rose from 12% in 2001 to 50% in 2008, boards still did not 
implement 50% of all precatory proposals supported by a majority of their shareholders). 
97 Some resolutions involve a subject matter so complex that it cannot be squeezed into 
the 500-word limit imposed by Rule 14a-8. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2014) (“The 
proposal . . . may not exceed 500 words.”). For those, a precatory resolution setting forth a 
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proposals on director qualifications; proposals to staff certain committees with 
independent directors; proposals to allow shareholders to recover costs from 
proxy contests; proposals to repeal exclusive forum bylaws; proposals on 
majority voting for directors98 and proposals to grant shareholders the right to 
call a special meeting of shareholders.99 
One might expect that shareholders would not rely on the good will of 
boards, which by definition are opposed to the precatory resolution as a 
substantive matter, if they do not have to.100 Moreover, the right to amend 
 
broad goal and leaving it to the board to work out the detail may be the best realistic 
alternative. The resolutions mentioned below, with the possible exception of the resolution 
on proxy contest costs, involve straightforward subject matters. 
98 Of the twenty-two proposals for confidential voting between 1998 and 2002, all were 
precatory. See GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 8 (2002), available 
at http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2002.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NX5N-R2FN; GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 8 
(2001), available at http://www.computershare-
na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2001.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VM3X-ARFV 
[hereinafter GEORGESON 2001]; GEORGESON 2000, supra note 2, at 8; GEORGESON, ANNUAL 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 8 (1999), available at http://www.computershare-
na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr1999.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D7AG-LCEN; 
GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 9 (1998), available at 
http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr1998.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8Q2F-68T6.  
Of the fourteen proposals regarding director qualifications from 2010 to 2012, all were 
precatory. See GEORGESON 2012, supra note 44, at 20, 27; GEORGESON, ANNUAL 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 22, 27 (2011), available at http://www.computershare-
na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NM6K-U2K7 
[hereinafter GEORGESON 2011]; GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 
26, 33-34 (2010), available at http://www.computershare-
na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2010.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/82Y-RZHT 
[hereinafter GEORGESON 2010].  
Of the 151 shareholder proposals regarding majority voting for directors over the five-
year period 2008-2012, all but two were precatory. See GEORGESON, 2012, supra note 44, 
18, 20; GEORGESON 2011, supra, at 20, 22; GEORGESON 2010, supra at 24, 26; GEORGESON, 
ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 20, 22 (2009), available at 
http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2009.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/N89Z-YEMM [hereinafter GEORGESON 2009]; GEORGESON 2008, supra note 
80, at 20, 22.  
Of the seventeen proposals from 1998 to 2008 to staff certain committees with 
independent directors, only one was not precatory. See GEORGESON 2001, supra, at 8, 13.  
99 In Delaware, the bylaws may grant shareholders the right to call a special meeting. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2011) (“Special meetings of the stockholders may be 
called . . . by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation 
or by the bylaws.”). However, some companies have charter provisions specifying who may 
(and may not) call a special meeting. For those companies, shareholder meeting proposals 
require a charter amendment and could only be made via a precatory resolution. 
100 Shareholder activists, of course, complain when boards ignore precatory resolutions 
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bylaws is, next to the right to elect directors, one of the few rights that 
shareholders can exercise unilaterally. It is currently the only way for 
shareholders to change the governance rules without going through the 
board.101 So, from the perspective of shareholder rights advocates, bylaw 
amendments present a unique opportunity to be grasped,102 while, from the 
perspective of managerialists, they present a chink in the armor of board-
centered governance. Bylaw amendments, one might think, are thus the 
battleground on which shareholders can assert their limited unilateral 
governance powers. 
Yet, AFCSME’s proposal was merely a recommendation for the board to 
separate the CEO and Chairman positions.103 The AFSCME proposal is not 
 
that receive majority shareholder support. See Shareholder Democracy: Battling for 
Corporate America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006 (“Shareholder activists . . . are unimpressed 
. . . . [E]ven if shareholders vote overwhelmingly for these resolutions, the board can ignore 
them. Most of the shareholder resolutions on the proxy are ‘precatory’—that is, advisory 
only. Boards have a long record of ignoring such advice. For example . . . in 1997-2003, 131 
resolutions to abolish staggered boards received a majority of the shareholder votes cast. By 
late 2004, less than a third of those resolutions had been acted on.”); J. Robert Brown, 
Shareholder Participation in Governance and Precatory Proposals, RACE TO THE BOTTOM 
(Nov. 11, 2008, 6:41 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/6J3T-4HAZ (emphasizing that 
precatory resolutions weaken shareholder leverage because “companies can and often do 
ignore them. Thus, they falsely create the appearance of shareholder involvement in the 
governance process”); Glyn A. Holton, SEC Enforcement: Will They or Won’t They?, NEW 
CAPITALIST (Mar. 31, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/G6A6-L58J (remarking that 
although boards are generally responsive to precatory resolutions, there are many exceptions 
where they ignore resolutions with majority support).  
101 See Insignificance, supra note 57, at 1412 n.194 (“It also deserves mention that, under 
the law of Delaware and some other states, shareholders can adopt a majority bylaw which 
could not then be amended by the board.”). 
102 For example, Harvard Law professor Lucian Bebchuk has complained that, “U.S. 
corporate law has long denied shareholders the power to change the company’s basic rules 
of the game.” Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1784, 1785 (2006) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules]. He likewise 
argued that shareholders should be given the power to adopt changes in the certificate of 
incorporation and to effect reincorporations “unilaterally,” without the approval of the board 
of directors. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 845-46 (2005); see also Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 
supra, at 1812-13 (“[B]oards’ control over changes in the rules of the game regulating their 
own power is highly problematic. Moving to a regime with shareholder power to make such 
decisions would improve governance arrangements across a wide range of corporate 
issues.”). 
103 JPMorgan does not impose any supermajority voting requirements for shareholder 
bylaw amendments, which could also have been a reason to opt for a precatory resolution 
over a mandatory bylaw amendment. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report (Form 8-
K), at 2 (Jan. 25, 2010) (requiring that the “[b]y-laws may be added to, amended, altered or 
repealed at any meeting of the Board by vote of a majority of the entire Board, provided that 
written notice of any such proposed action shall be given to each director prior to such 
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unusual. Almost all shareholder proposals dealing with the separation of CEO 
and Chairman—the single most popular governance proposal in the 2012 
season104—are introduced as precatory resolutions.105 In fact, Rule 14a-8 
proposals for mandatory bylaw amendments of any sort are extraordinarily 
rare.106 Why, given all the rhetoric about shareholders’ rights and the need to 
strengthen them, don’t shareholders exercise the rights that they already have? 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE PHENOMENON 
With so much shareholder activism unrelated to any material benefit, why 
do shareholder activists engage in it and why do corporations and their 
defenders often resist it? And why do shareholder activists not pursue options, 
like mandatory bylaw amendments or charter amendments constraining pills, 
which would matter more? In this Part, we will suggest several possible 
answers to this conundrum. 
A. False Perceptions 
One possible reason for symbolic activism is that the partisans wrongly 
believe that their activism has a direct substantive impact. Here we need to 
distinguish between leaders and foot soldiers. 
Activists and their managerialist antagonists come in a range of 
sophistication, from individual investors and managers, to governance 
professionals at institutional investors, to hedge fund managers, shareholder 
advisory firms, law firms, and other sophisticated actors lobbying for and 
against various initiatives. Some of these actors may not have the legal 
sophistication to see—or may not want to expend the effort to determine—
whether implementation of a proposal would matter. Thus, for example, some 
 
meeting, or that notice of such addition, amendment, alteration or repeal shall have been 
given at the preceding meeting of the Board”); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report 
(Form 8-K), at 3-4 (Apr. 7, 2006) (necessitating for bylaw amendment only “the affirmative 
vote of the holders of capital stock representing not less than a majority of the voting power 
represented by the outstanding shares of capital stock of the Corporation entitled to vote”). 
104 See GEORGESON 2012, supra note 44, at 18 (finding that 46 out of 88 board-related 
proposals from the 2012 annual meeting season were proposals related to creating an 
independent board chairman or separating the positions of chair and CEO). 
105 Over the five-year period 2008-2012, of the 151 shareholder proposals to have an 
independent board chairman or to separate the roles of CEO and chairman, all but eight 
(94.7%) of these proposals were precatory. See GEORGESON 2012, supra note 44; 
GEORGESON 2011, supra note 98; GEORGESON 2010, supra note 98; GEORGESON 2009, supra 
note 98; GEORGESON 2008, supra note 80 (data compiled from the preceding sources for the 
period 2008-2012). 
106 Out of the 1561 shareholder proposals tracked by Georgeson and voted on over the 
five-year period 2008-2012, only 46 proposals (2.95% of all proposals) were binding bylaw 
amendments. See GEORGESON 2012, supra note 44, GEORGESON 2011, supra note 98; 
GEORGESON 2010, supra note 98; GEORGESON 2009, supra note 105; GEORGESON 2008, 
supra note 80 (data compiled from the preceding sources for the period 2008-2012). 
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activists may believe that proxy access would have enabled shareholders to get 
board representation at little effort and expense. Or they may not have bothered 
to check the details of a company’s charter provision to determine whether a 
supermajority vote requirement relates to any provision that was significant. 
Rank-and-file individual investors and smaller institutional investors 
presented with proposals made by others may well be confused about the 
importance and effects of issues like poison pill proposals, proxy access, 
majority voting, and so forth. Like ordinary voters in any election, the rank-
and-file shareholders have limited knowledge and minimal incentives to delve 
deeply into issues or to hire sophisticated advisors. It is not implausible to 
imagine that small institutional investors who received an ISS recommendation 
to oppose poison pills not approved by shareholders might have thought that 
doing so would preclude companies from adopting a poison pill in response to 
a hostile bid. 
Consistent with this possibility, companies that have access to sophisticated 
legal advice and that take the time to check the facts sometimes choose not to 
resist activist campaigns. For instance, many companies do not bother to renew 
a poison pill because they realize that there is little point in doing so and 
because they avoid the activists’ wrath by letting a pill expire.107 Similarly, 
many companies do not strongly resist the campaign to move from plurality to 
majority voting.108 
While it is possible that some activists are simply uninformed, this is 
unlikely to be the full story. The key actors who determine the outcome of 
most campaigns are sophisticated and have access to well-informed advisors. It 
is inconceivable that large institutional investors, hedge funds, and proxy 
advisors are simply confused about, for example, the legal impact of a 
company not renewing its poison pill.109 Thus, when ISS instituted a policy to 
 
107 See Katz & McIntosh, supra note 12, at 3 (“[W]hen confronted with shareholder 
pressure, there is no need for a board to incur negative publicity by renewing an unpopular 
poison pill. . . . A company is better served when the board eschews a fight on this issue and 
simply retains the flexibility to adopt an effective rights plan in response to a takeover 
threat.”); Emiliano M. Catan, The Irrelevance of Active Poison Pills: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment 20-22 (May 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://files.nyu.edu/emc436/public/Papers/MarambioCatan_PoisonPills.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EM7D-WSF6 (illustrating that unless there is little threat from activists, 
most companies feel they should use an “on-the-shelf strategy” where they refrain “from 
renewing the pill, but drafting a document that would enable them to adopt a pill 
immediately in case that was deemed necessary”). 
108 See, e.g., Memorandum from David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz, Corporate Governance Update: Director Elections and Majority Voting 4 
(Dec. 29, 2005) (on file with author) (recommending that boards accommodate proposals to 
institute majority voting). 
109 But see Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 599, 599-604 (2013) (arguing that even sophisticated investors make important 
decisions without availing themselves of easily obtainable information). 
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oppose most poison pills that were not approved by shareholders,110 or when 
Fidelity developed its proxy guidelines opposing most such pills,111 it is 
unlikely that ISS and Fidelity believed that the company would be barred from 
implementing a pill if it became subject to the hostile bid. Something more 
must be going on. 
B. “Public Interest” Explanations 
1. Low Gain, Low Pain 
Many partisans may well understand that the contested governance issues 
we discussed have at most a trivial effect on company value. But then, much of 
this activism is not very expensive either. The marginal cost of voting in favor, 
or against, a proposal is close to nil. Further, the costs of preparing and 
submitting a proposal, requesting a no-action letter, commenting on a proposed 
SEC rule, or issuing a press release are a miniscule fraction of the value of a 
publicly traded company or of the holdings of an institutional investor.112 It 
would thus be entirely rational for a partisan to believe that incurring these 
expenses is justified, even if an issue has a trivial effect, as long as one is 
reasonably confident about the direction of the effect. 
But this cost-benefit based explanation still leaves several questions 
unanswered. For one, what explains the heated rhetoric? Is it merely harmless 
campaign hyperbole or is more going on? And why do some institutional 
investors not just talk the talk, but also walk the walk, by, for example, voting 
against directors who supported the adoption of a poison pill? Furthermore, 
what explains the selection of largely symbolic issues that are being pursued? 
If these issues are (wrongly) depicted as important, won’t they divert energy 
from other issues that are more consequential? 
2. Principles Matter 
Suppose that everyone understands the gap between rhetoric and reality in 
 
110 See WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, RISKMATRICS/ISS ISSUES POLICY UPDATES FOR 2010 
PROXY SEASON 2 (2009), available at 
www.weil.com/files/upload/briefing_sec_cg_2009_nov.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AS67-PBZY (stating that ISS will “recommend a negative vote with respect 
to all continuing directors” where the board has adopted, renewed, changed or maintained a 
pill “without shareholder approval”). 
111 See Fidelity Funds’ Proxy Voting Guidelines: November 2013 III.A.1 FIDELITY (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3B3L-ABJL (stating Fidelity will 
“generally withhold authority for the election of all directors or directors on responsible 
committees” if a poison pill was introduced, extended or adopted “without shareholder 
approval”). 
112 See generally Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from 
a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 623-29 (2013) (discussing how best to 
calculate costs of shareholder activism in light of the costs an activist bears and the potential 
returns the activist may receive). 
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shareholder activism. It is still possible that the partisans nevertheless choose 
to wage a battle as a matter of “principle.” In fact, many of the proxy 
guidelines published by mutual funds sound as if principles matter. Fidelity, 
for example, will generally withhold its vote on all incumbent directors—
regardless of other factors—if the board adopts a poison pill without 
shareholder approval, unless the pill meets certain narrow criteria.113 Likewise, 
the New York State Common Retirement Fund will support proposals to 
eliminate supermajority requirements—without apparent regard to what they 
pertain to—because supermajority provisions “can be used to defeat corporate 
democracy.”114 
How might principles matter? High profile battles over principles may have 
significant educational value. In the shift in U.S. boardrooms from a 
managerial conception of the board to a more “shareholder-centric” view, these 
battles almost certainly were important in reorienting directors’ understanding 
of their roles. Moreover, for those directors who believe that their role is to 
further shareholder interests, evidence from activist battles may inform their 
decision-making. 
3. Proxy Battles 
A further possibility is that these battles are actually a fight about a different 
issue. Perhaps battles over principles, even when they make no practical 
difference, matter—at least when both sides agree that they do. There are 
several ways in which this may work. 
First, prevailing on a matter of “principle” may nevertheless have 
implications for the future. For one, it can demonstrate the activist’s ability (or 
the activists’ abilities) to mobilize shareholder support, garner votes, and 
obtain public support. It signals to the people on the other side, mostly 
executives and outside directors, but perhaps also politicians and regulators: 
“Do not cross me, or else.” By the same token, once a battle has commenced, 
lack of success signals to the other side that the activist can be safely ignored. 
The outcome of the contest may be interpreted to mean “shareholder forces are 
ascendant” or “management is still in control.” 
This is clearly how the press reports on the results. For example, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling invalidating proxy access was described as 
 
113 See Fidelity Funds’ Proxy Voting Guidelines: November 2013, supra note 111, at 
III.A.1 (stating that authority will be withheld generally for anti-takeover provisions 
extended or adopted without shareholder approval unless specific criteria are met). The 
guidelines provide several examples of these narrow criteria: if the poison pill includes a 
“Sunset Provision of less than five years” or a “Permitted Bid Feature,” if the pill is “linked 
to a business strategy that will result in greater value for the shareholders,” or if 
“[s]hareholder approval is required to reinstate the Poison Pill upon expiration.” Id. 
114 N.Y. STATE COMMON RET. FUND, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/proxyvotingguidelines.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/N4SD-VNRC (explaining that supermajority provisions can be used “to 
defeat corporate democracy, entrench status quo and diminish shareholder rights”).  
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“[s]triking a blow to the ‘shareholder rights’ movement.”115 Likewise, the 
failure to separate the CEO and Chairman position at JPMorgan induced 
Business Week to predict “[n]ow that they’ve picked the fight with the biggest 
kid on the block—i.e., JPMorgan and Jamie—and lost it, other people are 
going to say, ‘How powerful are you guys?’”116 
Indeed, from this perspective, the partisans may be aware that the direct 
stakes are low and may even see an advantage in waging battles over issues 
that do not inherently matter. Battles without a tangible effect mean that the 
collateral damage inflicted is low. What better way, for example, to show one’s 
power than to push companies not to renew their poison pills or to remove 
essentially meaningless provisions for supermajority voting? Since the impact 
is symbolic, success can do little direct harm. 
Moreover, the risks to activists from being wrong are much reduced in 
battles over principle. In 2007, shareholders rejected Carl Icahn’s $37.25 per 
share offer for Lear Corporation, an automobile parts manufacturer, after ISS 
and Glass Lewis both recommended voting against.117 Two years later, Lear 
Corporation filed for bankruptcy.118 A few more recommendations like this 
could lead investors to stop following ISS and Glass Lewis.119 
The ultimate objective, according to this explanation, goes beyond the 
explicit issue over which the battle is waged. Rather, the battles exert pressure 
on directors to pay more attention to shareholder concerns more broadly. If 
activists can prevail on a shareholder proposal, they are more likely to be able 
to prevail in other battles that matter more. For larger shareholders, being taken 
seriously when it matters is extremely important. It assures that senior 
management will at least listen to you when you have doubts over the 
company’s business strategy. It induces the lead director to take the telephone 
call from the institutional investor when the company is facing an actual 
hostile bid, when the board is deliberating whether to fire the CEO, when the 
board is looking to add some independent directors, or when management has 
made a buyout offer. It gets you access to the head of the compensation 
committee when you want to push for greater performance sensitivity in the 
CEO’s pay. 
More generally, the battles may be part of a broader public policy initiative 
to change law and regulations in a direction that gives shareholders more 
power. Having prevailed in these symbolic battles, activists can more credibly 
 
115 Jessica Holzer, Court Deals Blow to SEC, Activists, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at B3. 
116 Nick Summers, Jamie Dimon Wins Big in JPMorgan Shareholder Vote, BUS. WK., 
May 21, 2013. 
117 See Lear Shareholders Reject $2.9 B Icahn Deal, USA TODAY, July 16, 2007. 
118 See Auto Parts Maker Lear Corp. Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS, July 7, 2009. 
119 Given this risk, it should be unsurprising that, after raising questions about the 
controversial Dell going-private offer but failing to attract competing bids, ISS, Egan-Jones, 
and Glass Lewis all ultimately recommended shareholder approval. See generally Shira 
Ovide, ISS, Two Others Recommend Dell Buyout, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2013. 
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lobby the SEC and Congress to increase shareholder power further. “The 
shareholders overwhelmingly support increasing shareholder power,” activists 
can argue, “look at the support for these shareholder proposals relating to X, Y 
and Z.” 
4. The Slippery Slope 
Another possibility is that partisans view corporate governance politics as a 
multi-year, multi-engagement process, so that the first battle in a campaign 
may take on outsize importance. Consider, for example, the battle over the 
SEC’s “proxy access” initiative. As we have argued elsewhere, the three 
percent/three year threshold for access to the corporate proxy statement meant 
that the SEC’s initiative would likely have had minimal effects: shareholders 
who might have used proxy access would not have qualified, while 
shareholders who would have qualified would likely not have been interested 
or would have been unwilling to accept the limitations that accompanied it.120 
So why was there a hard-fought battle? One plausible explanation is that 
partisans on both sides hoped (or feared) that the proposed proxy access rules 
would be just the first step. If adopted and held valid, and not used, activists 
could have returned to the SEC to argue that the thresholds should be lowered, 
the limitations relaxed, and so forth. Better and easier to fight it at the outset, 
defenders of management might have thought, than to have to fight constant 
battles against incremental expansion. 
C. “Public Choice” Explanations: It’s the Activists, Stupid 
Another, not mutually exclusive, possibility is that professional activists, at 
least those who are governance professionals, are aware of the large gap 
between rhetoric and reality in their campaigns but pursue activism for its own 
(or rather their own) sake. What keeps activists busy—and employed—is 
activism. 
Take, for example, ISS, the leading proxy advisor. As part of its business, 
ISS provides voting advice to its clients on all issues that shareholders are 
asked to vote on. It may not be conducive to ISS’s business were its advice on 
shareholder proposals to redeem a pill a dismissive, “This issue is of no 
practical significance. It really does not matter how you vote.” Nor would it 
behoove ISS to proclaim that the voting rules on the most common ballot 
question for shareholders—whether to vote for nominees to the board or to 
withhold authority—is not very important. If none of this matters, why pay for 
voting advice? Surely, the price ISS can charge for its advice and analysis is 
higher if shareholders vote on issues that matter. Governance professionals 
working directly for large institutional investors face similar incentives.121 
 
120 See Insignificance, supra note 57, at 1382 (“In sum, judging from their past actions, 
the set of shareholders that have shown both an interest in activism and have some potential 
to be eligible for proxy access is fairly limited.”). 
121 Governance professionals may also prefer to pursue forms of activism that are 
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Corporate lawyers advising boards may likewise have an incentive to 
overstate the importance of some of the issues. They can enhance their 
business by privately advising companies on how to respond to activist 
campaigns—and advice to do something tends to generate more business than 
advice to do nothing. They can also enhance their reputations as fervent 
defenders of managerial power by publicly opposing the activists’ efforts. 
Leading corporate lawyers may well have been aware that the SEC’s proposals 
on proxy access were unlikely to pose a serious threat, but they may still have 
opposed it in editorials and comment letters to impress their clients. 
But the “public choice” explanation is, at best, partial.122 Generally, the 
“public choice” approach views the political process as a contest among 
interest groups over “rents” with public-spirited justifications used to disguise 
interest group rent-seeking.123 Trucking regulation, classically, is explained as 
the result of incumbent truckers and organized labor securing barriers to entry, 
and monopoly rents, at the expense of consumers.124 Thus, while it predicts a 
gap between rhetoric (public-spirited) and reality (rent-seeking), it posits that 
there are rents to be divided—that controversies have material stakes—while it 
provides no explanation for vigorous contests over issues with no material 
consequences. 
D. Symbols and Myths 
The indirect “public interest” explanations, combined with the “public 
choice” perspective and the possibility that some actors have false perceptions, 
go some way towards explaining why these battles continue even when the 
direct stakes seem trivial to a dispassionate observer. But more seems to be at 
stake than appears in any of these explanations. These battles can feel like they 
involve issues that are genuinely important matters of national import. What 
social function might the “corporate governance industry” be serving? To 
 
justifiable, even if they are not necessarily the best ones. Cf. Claire Hill, Justification Norms 
Under Uncertainty: A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 28-29 (2010) (arguing 
that, where a decision involves uncertainty, decision-makers may make justifiable choices, 
rather than the best choice). 
122 For a useful overview of “public choice” approaches and the contrast with “public 
interest” approaches, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: 
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-33 (1991). 
123 See id. at 14-15 (describing that “[p]ublic choice models often treat the legislative 
process as a microeconomic system” based upon individuals and groups who “rent-seek,” 
by seeking their own independent interests). 
124 See generally Thomas Moore, The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, 21 J.L. & 
ECON. 327, 330 (1978) (elaborating that both organized labor and owners of operating rights 
benefit from regulation that “has raised rents and prevented new firms from competing away 
the monopoly rent”); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. 
& ECON. 211, 239 (1976) (“Competitively determined, cost-based price differentials create 
an opportunity for political gain through entry and/or price regulation designed to suppress 
the effects of cost differences.”). 
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answer this question, we introduce Thurman Arnold, one of the great figures in 
American law, into the conversation. 
1. Politics as Folklore and Myth 
Born in Wyoming in 1891 and educated at Princeton and Harvard Law 
School, Thurman Arnold started teaching law at the University of Wyoming in 
1921, moved to the college of law at West Virginia University as dean in 1927, 
and then moved on to Yale in 1930, where he remained until 1938.125 Arnold 
published two interrelated books that present his perspective on politics and 
law: The Symbols of Government (1935)126 and The Folklore of Capitalism 
(1937).127 During the early years of the Roosevelt administration, Arnold 
became part of the New Deal “brain trust” and worked part-time in a variety of 
positions.128 When Robert Jackson left the Antitrust Division in 1938 to join 
the Supreme Court, Arnold was appointed his successor.129 There, Arnold 
pursued an aggressive enforcement strategy and built the Division into the 
large operation that it remains.130 After leaving the Antitrust Division in 1943, 
Arnold served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.131 In 1945, 
Arnold resigned to found a law firm with Paul Porter and Abe Fortas that 
survives today as Arnold and Porter.132 
Thurman Arnold provides an additional and quite distinctive perspective. In 
his view, law and politics serve entirely different functions than they claim, 
functions that, unless recognized, will subvert reform efforts: they are the 
“semi-sacred” ceremonies through which we make peace with the inherent but 
necessary contradictions between our ideals and reality.133 Although rooted in 
 
125 See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD 10-18, 39-44 (2005). 
126 THURMAN W. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 1935). 
127 THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1st ed. 1937). 
128 See WALLER, supra note 125, at 78-110 (discussing Arnold’s role in the Roosevelt 
administration and as part of Roosevelt’s group of advisors known as the “brain trust”). 
129 See id. at 78. 
130 See id. at 83-110 (exploring the major litigation and actions taken by Arnold while he 
led the Antitrust Division for five years). 
131 See id. at 108-10. 
132 See id. at 124-30. 
133 An alternative approach, now largely ignored in corporate governance analysis, finds 
its roots in Marx. See ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, MARX AND JUSTICE: THE RADICAL CRITIQUE OF 
LIBERALISM 50-85 (1982) (evaluating Marx’s criticisms of justice, capitalism, and 
economics). On this view, competitive political battles—indeed all of law, politics, culture, 
and ideology—are viewed as largely epiphenomenal, with material economic relations (the 
base) “conditioning” or “determining” law, politics, and ideology (the superstructure). See 
id. at 53-56 (articulating the connection between a given economic viewpoint, like the 
connection between wage and laborer in capitalism, and “the ideals of freedom and 
equality”). Analytically, the problem with this approach is that the precise links between 
economic relations and the development of law, politics, and ideology have never been 
spelled out with sufficient clarity to be analytically useful, at least in an area like corporate 
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the Legal Realism that surrounded him at Yale in the 1930s, Arnold rejected its 
reformist anti-formalism as blind “to the pervasiveness of symbols in the 
discourse of law and governance generally.”134 What distinguishes Arnold’s 
view from standard Legal Realism is this “anthropological turn,” evident in his 
choice of the terms “folklore” and “symbols.”135 Arnold’s embrace of this 
anthropological approach allowed for the possibility that the spectacle itself 
may be the point of the activity and not just an incidental byproduct. 
An impatient New Dealer, Arnold was annoyed with the extent to which 
legal and economic concepts interfered with what he took to be sensible, 
necessary and practical responses. To make progress on social problems (i.e., 
to advance the New Deal agenda), Arnold thought, one must grapple with the 
hold that these concepts have on people: “We cannot be practical about social 
problems if we are under the illusion that we can solve them without 
complying with the taboos and customs of the tribe.”136 It is this 
combination—a legal realist’s skepticism about legal concepts combined with 
a practical politician’s understanding of the critical role of ritual and taboos in 
effecting change—that is most distinctive about Arnold’s view. 
Arnold paid particular attention to the ways in which myths and ceremonies 
of various sorts are used to reconcile imbalances in power, including 
imbalances in power between individuals and large firms, thereby protecting 
these organizations against threats. 
 
law. While it is easy enough to argue that the entire structure of corporate law and 
governance serves to legitimate the economic relations that constitute a market economy 
(indeed, it is indisputably true!), deploying this approach to analyze more fine-grained 
issues is not easy. In what follows, we largely ignore these approaches except insofar as we 
examine the “legitimation” function of corporate governance politics.  
134 For a detailed and very insightful analysis of Arnold and the context in which he was 
writing, see Mark Fenster, The Symbols of Governance: Thurman Arnold and Post-Realist 
Legal Theory, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1053, 1070 (2003) [hereinafter Fenster, The Symbols of 
Governance], which discusses Arnold’s shift away from Legal Realism as he began “an 
inquiry into the deeper spiritual, symbolic forms and practices that shape ‘Law’ as a field of 
governance.” In what follows, we rely heavily on his description. 
135 See id. at 1084-85 (“Although he cited no anthropologists in either of his mid-1930s 
monographs, the words folklore and symbols in his titles clearly evoke the anthropological 
approach.”). In this regard, Arnold shared a view with others who had made the ideology of 
politics a topic for study, such as Harold Lasswell, Walter Lippman, and Vilfredo Pareto. 
Murray Edelman picked up the theme decades later. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC 
USES OF POLITICS 22-43, 188-94 (1964). These themes have been addressed more recently 
as well. See generally Mark Fenster, Murray Edelman, Polemicist of Public Ignorance, 17 
CRITICAL REV. 367, 367-74, 378-84 (2005) (discussing the theoretical and methodological 
questions raised by Murray Edelman’s work about the symbolic nature of politics); Fenster, 
The Symbols of Governance, supra note 134, at 1079-84 (exploring the relation between 
Arnold and relevant political theories available at the time). Although others focused on the 
symbolic aspect of politics, Arnold is useful for our purposes because he focused his 
critique, inter alia, on business law. 
136 ARNOLD, supra note 127 at 205. 
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For corporate law, Arnold’s analysis of corporate personality and antitrust 
are the most directly relevant. In what follows, we quote liberally from 
Arnold’s work in order to give a sense of his distinctive voice and perspective. 
For Arnold, legal personality, the “personification of the corporation,” was 
all about identifying large concentrations of economic power with the 
autonomous entrepreneur who figures prominently in nineteenth-century 
rugged individualism.137 Our pioneer civilization, which formed the bedrock of 
American conceptions of legitimacy, was one 
in which the prevailing ideal was that of the freedom and dignity of the 
individual engaged in the accumulation of wealth. The independence of 
the free man from central authority was the slogan for which men fought 
and died. This free man was a trader who got ahead by accumulating 
money.138 
But this ideal of rugged individualism clashed with the reality of large 
industrial organizations. As Arnold wrote, “[i]ndeed, the great organization in 
which most men were employees, and a few at the top were dictators, was a 
contradiction of that philosophy.”139 
On the other hand, technological change and the emergence of specialized 
techniques made large-scale operations essential to realizing economies of 
scale and scope, “to producing goods in large enough quantities and at a price 
low enough so that they could be made part of the American standard of 
living.”140 
How have we dealt with this tension? For Arnold, the key to understanding 
the doctrine of “corporate personality” is that it mediated this gap: “[I]n order 
to tolerate [large corporations], men had to pretend that corporations were 
individuals.”141 Moreover, by identifying the great industrial organizations 
with the “dignities, freedom, and general ethics of the individual,”142 any move 
to break them up wholesale could be deflected into far less threatening 
piecemeal prosecutions of bad actors. Indeed, “[s]ince individuals are supposed 
to do better if let alone, . . . [t]he laissez faire religion, based on a conception 
of a society composed of competing individuals, was transferred automatically 
to industrial organizations with nation-wide power and dictatorial forms of 
government.”143 
 
137 See id. at 185-206 (exploring the “curious ceremonies” that allow organizations to be 
treated as individuals). 
138 Id. at 185-86. 
139 Id. at 187. 
140 Id. at 207. 
141 Id. at 187. 
142 Id. at 188. 
143 Id. at 189. Arnold provides a wonderful 1936 quote from John W. Davis attacking the 
regulation of holding companies. What struck Arnold as notable was Davis’s attempt “to 
rouse his audience to a high pitch of indignation against an act regulating holding 
companies” by arguing as follows: 
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Arnold was not suggesting that these myths should be dispensed with, but 
that we should not let them confuse us: 
[This book] does not attack the use of the corporate personality in 
folklore. The results have been the creation of one of the greatest 
productive machines that the world has ever known, and this perhaps is 
justification enough if anyone is interested in justifying what has 
happened. This book is concerned only with diagnosing the present 
difficulties which have come upon us now that the industrial feudalism is 
no longer protecting large groups of our citizens who demand security, 
and with trying to explain the ideological difficulties which prevent the 
creating of organizations which will give that protection. We cannot be 
practical about social problems if we are under the illusion that we can 
solve them without complying with the taboos and customs of the tribe. 
The corporate personality is part of our present religion. . . . Since, 
however, we must use the words and ceremonies, it becomes important 
that we be able to use them intelligently.144 
Arnold’s classic analysis of antitrust takes a similar approach, viewing it as 
one of the “most important ceremonies which have dramatized the rugged 
individualism of business organizations.”145 The battle against monopoly is 
like campaigns against prostitution: 
We celebrate our ideals of chastity by constantly engaging in wars on 
vice. We permit prostitution to flourish by treating it as a somewhat 
minor crime and never taking the militant measures which would actually 
stamp it out. The result is a sub rosa institution which organizes the 
prostitutes after a fashion, at least to the extent that there never seems to 
be any shortage in our large cities. . . .146 
Further: 
Thus in those days anyone who attacked the “Trusts” could achieve the 
same public worship as a minister of the gospel who had the energy to 
attack vice. It was this that made Theodore Roosevelt a great man. 
 
There is something in this act that arouses me far beyond the scope and tenor of the act 
itself. In one respect it is unique in the history of our legislation; in one respect it 
constitutes the gravest threat to the liberties of American citizens that has emanated 
from the halls of Congress in my lifetime. This is strong language. But I mean to make 
it so.  
Id. at 190 (quoting John W. Davis in the New York Times, Aug. 26, 1936). While the 
regulation of public utility holding companies was a reasonably important issue from both 
an Antitrust and securities law perspective (with regard to the Public Utility Holding Act of 
1935, see SEC DIV. OF INV. MGMT., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC-UTILITY HOLDING 
COMPANIES 13-19, 36-40, 58-60, 117-19 (1995)), the claim that the 1935 Act constituted 
“the gravest threat to the liberties of American citizens” was absurd hyperbole. 
144 ARNOLD, supra note 127, at 205. 
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 208. 
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Historians now point out that Theodore Roosevelt never accomplished 
anything with his trust busting. Of course he didn’t. The crusade was not 
a practical one. It was part of a moral conflict and no preacher ever 
succeeded in abolishing any form of sin.147 
For a civic religion officially dedicated to the preservation of competition 
among individuals (or small businesses identifiable with their owners), 
“‘[b]igness’ was regarded as a curse because it led to monopoly” and market 
power.148 But because large enterprises remained economically essential, “it 
was inevitable that a ceremony should be evolved which reconciled current 
mental pictures of what men thought society ought to be with reality.”149 
This social reality required development of a procedure that attacked 
bigness on rational legal and economic ground, but still permitted large 
enterprises to flourish. Such pressures gave rise to the antitrust laws. The 
Sherman Act proclaimed grandly that “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”150 
But these words were never taken literally. The bold statement of the ideal and 
its lack of actual enforcement was designed to convince reformers and the 
public either that large combinations did not actually exist, or else that if they 
did exist, they were about to be done away with just as soon as right-thinking 
men were elected to office. Trust-busting “became one of the great moral 
issues of the day, while at the same time great combinations thrived and 
escaped regulation.”151 
As Arnold saw it: 
The antitrust laws remained as a most important symbol. Whenever 
anyone demanded practical regulation, they formed an effective moral 
obstacle, since all the liberals would answer with a demand that the 
antitrust laws be enforced. Men like Senator Borah founded political 
careers on the continuance of such crusades, which were entirely futile 
but enormously picturesque, and which paid big dividends in terms of 
personal prestige.152 
Effective regulation of large organizations would have been easy, but not 
practical: 
[H]ad society been able to operate in an era of growing specialization 
without these organizations – it would have been easy enough to kill them 
by practical means. A few well-directed provisions putting a 
discriminatory tax on large organizations would have done the trick, 
 
147 Id. at 211. 
148 Id. at 207. 
149 Id. 
150 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
151 ARNOLD, supra note 127, at 207-08. 
152 Id. at 217. 
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provided some other form of organization was growing at the same time 
to fill the practical need. Since the organizations were demanded, 
attempts to stop their growth necessarily became purely ceremonial.153 
This from the man who would soon build the Antitrust Division into a high-
profile agency that, for all its enforcement efforts, had the good sense to focus 
on behavioral rather than structural remedies.154 
Arnold seems to have saved his most savage (and sincere) condemnation for 
those poor well-meaning fools who would have us live up to our articulated 
principles because doing so would destroy necessary institutions and cause 
serious social harm. Our institutional creeds, he emphasized, “must be false in 
order to function effectively. . . . Love of consistency and devotion to realism 
will wreck any institutional creed. When consistency is emphasized, 
conflicting ideals which may be very important in retaining loyalties have to be 
abandoned.”155 As with campaigns against prostitution, appeals to live up to 
our ideals should not be taken seriously: 
The confusion accompanying most liberal reform movements is due to 
the fact that they are generally attempts to make the institution practice 
what it preaches in a situation where, if the ideal were followed, the 
function of the institution could not be performed. . . . The history of 
human organization is strewn with the wreckage caused by people who 
tried honestly and sincerely to follow the logical implications of accepted 
doctrine.156 
 
153 Id. at 211. It is difficult to know how seriously to take Arnold’s “complimentary” 
description of Roosevelt’s accomplishment:  
Theodore Roosevelt, with his big stick that never hit anybody, accomplished two 
things. First, he convinced the public that if we would only drive politics out of the 
Department of Justice the laws were sufficient to make these big individuals really 
compete. Second, he convinced corporate executives that it was a good thing to hire 
public-relations counsel and show that they also were followers of the true religion. 
Id. at 217. 
154 The connection between Arnold’s ideas regarding antitrust in Folklore and his views 
as an enforcer at the time of his confirmation hearings and at the Antitrust Division is 
complex. See WALLER, supra note 125, at 78-110.  
155 ARNOLD, supra note 127, at 356-57. 
156 Id. at 375, 378. As with any ironist, especially in print, it is not always clear when 
Arnold’s language is sarcastic in criticizing benighted practices or when it is serious in his 
approbation. In particular, Arnold’s critique of Antitrust, when juxtaposed with his 
aggressive enforcement stance as head of the Antitrust Division, might well suggest that his 
critique was directed at a particular era of lax antitrust enforcement—one that was hobbled 
by undue respect for myth and folklore—rather than a rejection of Antitrust more generally. 
On the other hand, as head of the Antitrust Division, he never tried to restructure 
concentrated industry or enact any other fundamental changes. See WALLER, supra note 
125, at 78-110. For our purposes, which are generally descriptive, the normative point of his 
armchair anthropology can be set aside in favor of the analytic insight that it provides. With 
all the high-sounding rhetoric deployed in battles over corporate governance reform, a 
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2. What is the Folklore of Corporate Governance? 
How might a Thurman Arnold describe our current “Folklore of Corporate 
Governance”? What is the conflict to which corporate governance reform 
might provide a “ritual” response? A moment’s reflection suggests that our 
myths have not changed appreciably since the nineteenth century rise of the 
great industrial corporations. Now, as then, we need to believe that in even—
and especially—the largest corporations, there are individual shareholders who 
collectively own and control those corporations. Because shareholders exercise 
control over managers, perhaps mediated through markets, it is acceptable that 
a small group of managers control huge concentrations of capital for which 
they are paid princely sums. 
We confront just the sort of gaping hole that Arnold found so obvious. A 
Thurman Arnold would find it laughable to claim that this picture accurately 
describes the large, publicly held corporations that are the focus of corporate 
governance reform. First, as scholarship on institutional investors shows, 
shares are held by intermediaries and managed by agents whose incentives at 
best roughly track those of the ultimate beneficiaries.157 Further, over the last 
forty years, ownership by institutional investors has steadily increased from 
fifteen percent in 1965 to around fifty percent.158 There are essentially no 
shareholders of the sort that the myth hypothesizes. While various sorts of 
intermediaries have some direct and indirect influence over managers of large 
firms,159 that influence does not remotely approach the degree of control 
posited by the mythical picture of a limited number of actual individual 
shareholders who elect directors to manage their property. Finally, when 
economic actors actually emerge who might play the role laid out for 
 
cynicism corrosive enough to dissolve can be a useful tool.  
 Murray Edelman, some thirty years later in his seminal work, The Symbolic Uses of 
Politics, carried a very similar approach into the political turmoil of the 1960s. Like Arnold, 
Edelman viewed politics as symbolic and spectacular; it was an effort to reassure the 
masses, induce quiescence, and preserve the status quo: “Political forms thus come to 
symbolize what large masses of men need to believe about the state to reassure themselves. 
It is the needs, the hopes, and the anxieties of men that determine the meanings.” EDELMAN, 
supra note 135, at 2. At the same time, of course, political decisions also allocate goods, 
services, and power: “There is accordingly no reason to expect that the meanings will be 
limited to the instrumental functions the political forms serve. The capacity of political 
forms both to serve as a powerful means of expression for mass publics and to convey 
benefits to particular groups is a central theme of this book.” Id. Symbolic politics, then, can 
be, but need not be, accompanied by interest group rent-seeking. 
157 See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 464-78 (1991) (describing the factors that interfere 
with alignment of the interests of money managers and beneficiaries). 
158 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, TEX L. REV., 987, 995-97 (2010) 
[hereinafter Embattled CEOs] (illustrating the steady rise in institutional investors). 
159 See id. at 1037-40 (providing examples of the ways in which shareholders can 
influence a CEO’s decision-making). 
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shareholders—think of hedge funds—a reaction against them is usually 
immediate.160 
Yet, as Arnold would be quick to point out, because the myth of American 
corporate governance conflicts with the reality of large publicly owned 
corporations, and because large concentrations of capital are necessary for 
many business entities operating in world product and capital markets, “it was 
inevitable that a ceremony should be evolved which reconciled current mental 
pictures of what men thought society ought to be with reality.”161 Just as “it 
became necessary to develop a procedure which constantly attacked bigness on 
rational legal and economic grounds, and at the same time never really 
interfered with combinations,”162 so, too, it became necessary to develop a 
procedure which constantly attacked “managerial agency costs” or the 
“separation of ownership and control” on rational legal and economic grounds, 
but at the same time never really interfered with a separation that became a 
practical necessity when economies of scale required massive concentrations 
of capital.163 
Like the “curse of bigness,” the beauty of viewing “the agency cost 
problem” as the core problem of corporate governance is that every time there 
is a crisis and a call for regulation, there is a ready response that avoids 
confronting the underlying “contradiction” or considering fundamental change: 
“if only managers’ interests were better aligned with those of the 
shareholders . . . .” This diagnosis implies a straightforward solution: enact 
measures that claim to improve that alignment. After the dot-com bubble burst, 
we had the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.164 After the crash of 2008, we had “say-on-
pay.”165 The SEC even managed to justify the rules on proxy access by 
 
160 See Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck 
the Economy, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (Feb. 26, 2013 9:22 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/RZ2N-736R (stating that 
shareholder voting power is being “harnessed by a gaggle of activist hedge funds who troll 
through SEC filings looking for . . . short-term profit without regard to . . . the company’s 
long-term prospects.”); Activist Investors: Let’s Do It My Way, ECONOMIST, May 25, 2013 
(stating that hedge fund activists “pester firms for a quick return of cash to shareholders”). 
161 ARNOLD, supra note 127, at 207. 
162 Id. 
163 The history of the battle for “shareholder democracy,” recounted in Dalia Tsuk 
Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1503, 1509 (2006), provides additional detail on the almost endless variations 
on this theme (“[N]one of these mechanisms is likely to change the century-long suspicion 
of the individual shareholder-participant and the corresponding empty rhetoric about 
shareholder democracy that helped bring, shape, and sustain today’s reality.”). 
164 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (2002) (“To 
protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made 
pursuant to the securities laws . . . .”). 
165 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (“Not less frequently than once every 3 years, a proxy or 
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reference to the financial crisis.166 
Although an Arnold would find the claims of corporate accountability 
laughable, he would save particularly sharp criticism for those reformers who 
would have us live up to our institutional creed by actually empowering 
individual shareholders to control managers! Indeed, from an Arnold 
perspective, what we need most, and have of course already developed, is a 
ritual that allows us to live with the contradictions, while practical non-
ideological people figure out how to make institutions serve social needs. 
Arnold’s analysis provides insight into an aspect of corporate governance 
politics that other explanations struggle with: What explains the choice of 
issues that activists pursue? Why not pursue reforms that are potentially more 
consequential? Why the heated rhetoric? 
The battle against managerial agency costs, an Arnold would say, is a moral 
crusade, not a practical one. The best issues to fight about are those that invoke 
core commitments. It hardly seems coincidental that the hardest fought battles 
involve issues that revolve around “shareholder democracy”: proxy access, 
poison pills adopted by boards without shareholder ratification, voting rules for 
electing directors, and elimination of supermajority voting requirements. These 
issues immediately tap into broader themes and commitments, regardless of the 
vast differences between political voting and shareholder voting.167 More 
generally, proposals to control “managerial agency costs,” like the moral 
crusades Arnold discussed, are a reliable crowd pleaser, especially when 
identified with actual (overpaid) managers: say-on-pay, shareholder approval 
 
consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for which the 
proxy solicitation rules of the Commission require compensation disclosure shall include a 
separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of 
executives . . . .”). 
166 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,669 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (“We recognized at 
that time that the financial crisis that the nation and markets had experienced heightened the 
serious concerns of many shareholders about the accountability and responsiveness of some 
companies and boards of directors to shareholder interests, and that these concerns had 
resulted in a loss of investor confidence. These concerns also led to questions about whether 
boards were exercising appropriate oversight of management, whether boards were 
appropriately focused on shareholder interests, and whether boards need to be more 
accountable for their decisions regarding issues such as compensation structures and risk 
management.”). 
167 For nice summaries of the various ways in which “shareholder democracy” and 
“political democracy” differ, see Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of 
Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1389-94 (2006) 
(“[C]omparisons between the corporate and civic polities . . . ultimately falter because 
participation in a corporation fundamentally differs from participation in a nation.”); A. 
Gilchrist Sparks, Corporate Democracy: What It Is, What It Isn’t, and What It Should Be, 
INSIGHTS, Mar. 2006, at 20, 20-21 (comparing the key elements of political and corporate 
democracy); Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477 (1958) (reviewing J.A. 
LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958)). 
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of incentive compensation, and anti-golden parachute proposals, to name a 
few. With these sorts of issues, it is immediately obvious which side is which, 
an absolute necessity in any Kabuki play.168 And because the battle lines are 
clear, strong language is justified. 
But to serve the ceremonial function of asserting shareholder control, 
shareholder activists must also pick issues where the chances of success are 
reasonably high. Introducing shareholder proposals on issues like 
reimbursement of proxy expenses—a more meaningful reform proposal that is 
likely to engender more managerial resistance for the very reason that it is 
more meaningful—and seeing the proposal defeated would not be a show of 
shareholder power, real or symbolic. 
To be clear, we are not suggesting that shareholder activists and 
management supporters are engaged in some conspiracy to divert the public 
from real reform. It is rather that symbolic activism happens to serve 
everyone’s interests. From the managerialist perspective, losing is acceptable 
and actual (as opposed to rhetorical) resistance is not too high. Most activists 
and shareholder rights advocates—public pension funds, union pension funds, 
ISS, proxy voting departments at institutional investors, academics—lack 
strong monetary incentives that directly reward them for increasing share 
values (and the few that do, such as hedge funds managers, tend not to engage 
in these symbolic battles). They know that issues related to shareholder 
democracy strike a chord with other shareholders and that they themselves are 
not immune to the allure of symbolic affirmations of shareholder power. That 
activism keeps the activists busy, that various arguments can be put forth for 
how shareholders benefit, and that the costs are low may not be the principal 
motivating factors. But these features at least assure that there is no internal 
opposition to symbolic activism. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
Our account of the gap between rhetoric and reality in shareholder activism 
has several implications for the corporate governance debate. 
A. Chicken Little 
The most direct implication is to take the rhetoric used by activists on all 
sides with a large pinch of salt. Despite protestations to the contrary, many 
issues at the forefront of shareholder activist campaigns and managerialists’ 
counter-campaigns do not have such weighty implications. Fundamental 
precepts of shareholder democracy are not, in fact, at stake, and it generally is 
not very likely that any reform movement will generate “profound effects,”169 
 
168 However, the common description of politics as nothing more than a “Kabuki play” 
may be unfair to Kabuki theater. Jon Lackman, It’s Time to Retire Kabuki, SLATE (Apr. 14, 
2010, 7:03 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/924K-VVNQ (“[T]here’s nothing ‘kabuki’ 
about the real Kabuki. . . . [I]t’s far from empty and monotonous.”). 
169 Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher, supra note 31, at 7. 
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be “groundbreaking,”170 or “wreak havoc.”171 Whether activist campaigns 
succeed or fail, the sky will not fall. Chicken Little can relax. 
B. Activists Just Want to Have Fun 
The focus by shareholder activists on core commitments to shareholder 
democracy and on issues capable of rallying mass support has costs. First, that 
focus can divert attention away from more significant changes that would 
provoke more significant opposition. Second, it can divert attention away from 
important technical issues that are hard to fit into the standard shareholders 
versus managers frame. 
Consider, for example, the multi-year battle on proxy access that claimed to 
be about reducing the costs of running a competing slate of candidates. Put 
aside the fact that after multiple SEC proposals and years of analysis, the SEC 
was not able to draft a cost-benefit analysis that satisfied the D.C. Circuit.172 
Even if the SEC rule had been upheld, it would have had a minimal impact on 
corporate governance: few shareholders would have qualified and most of 
those have shown no appetite for more forceful forms of governance 
activism.173 More importantly, however, the proxy access proposal would have 
failed to achieve the basic goal of substantially reducing the costs of proxy 
contests. While the rule would have made it easier to get a nominee on the 
ballot and would have reduced the costs of collecting ballots, the bulk of 
expenditures incurred in actual proxy contest—campaign expenses—would not 
have been affected by the rule.174 
While activists were preoccupied with proxy access, they were oddly silent 
on two other issues that actually can have significant effects. The first is 
discretionary broker voting in director elections. Historically, the NYSE 
regarded uncontested director elections—elections with only one slate of 
nominees—as routine, even when some shareholders waged an active 
campaign to convince other shareholders to “withhold” their votes from certain 
nominees. On routine issues, brokers are permitted to cast the votes of 
uninstructed shares. As a result, brokers could vote shares for which no 
specific instructions were received in favor of the board nominees.175 
According to some estimates, uninstructed shares may account for nineteen 
 
170 Hamilton, supra note 34, at 1. 
171 Katz & McIntosh, supra note 30, at 2. 
172 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Commission 
failed adequately to consider the rule’s effect upon efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation . . . .”). 
173 See Insignificance, supra note 57, at 1375-83 (“[M]ost proposals were submitted by 
individual investors with trivial stakes in the respective companies.”). 
174 See id. at 1383-94 (describing the pros and cons of proxy access). 
175 See Embattled CEOs, supra note 158, at 1016 (“Brokers, however, were permitted to 
cast the votes of uninstructed shares . . . .”). 
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percent of the votes cast at annual meetings.176 
With the rise of “withhold” votes, the margin of votes in uncontested 
elections began to matter. Thus, in October 2006, the NYSE proposed 
amending Rule 452 governing broker votes to redefine all director elections as 
non-routine.177 The proposed change required SEC approval to become 
effective. If there was ever an easy decision, one would have thought this was 
it. What reason could the SEC possibly assert for blocking the NYSE from 
adopting a rule that takes voting authority away from brokers who lack any 
economic interest in the underlying shares? Yet, it took the SEC over two 
years to solicit comments on the NYSE proposal and almost three years to 
approve it.178 Activists, for the most part, did not exert significant pressure on 
the SEC to move faster.179 
The second issue is reimbursement of proxy contest expenses. At the same 
time Delaware clarified that a proxy access regime could be adopted through 
bylaws, it also clarified that bylaws could require that a company reimburse 
reasonable expenses incurred by proxy challengers, either outright or subject to 
conditions (such as achieving a certain threshold of success).180 Expense 
reimbursement could potentially have a much stronger impact on corporate 
contests than proxy access because it would cover a much greater portion of 
the relevant proxy contest expenses. Yet activists have done virtually nothing 
on the expense reimbursement front: they have not developed model 
provisions for companies to enact or shareholders to propose, they have not 
rallied support for an expense reimbursement regime, they have not submitted 
precatory resolutions or mandatory proposals in meaningful numbers,181 and, 
 
176 See id. at 1016-17 (“[I]t is estimated that broker nonvotes amount on average to 19% 
of the votes cast at an annual meeting.”). This may be an overestimate. 
177 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK 
STOCK EXCHANGE 3 (2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/PWG_REPORT.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/DC9R-C8BR (“[T]he election of directors can no longer be 
considered a ‘routine’ event in the life of a corporation.”). 
178 See Embattled CEOs, supra note 158, at 1017 (“On July 1, 2009, the SEC finally 
approved the amendments, effectively ending discretionary broker voting in director 
elections . . . .”). 
179 See JAY W. EISENHOFER & MICHAEL J. BARRY, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM HANDBOOK 
§ 9.02[G] (2005) (stating that “[y]ears passed without the SEC acting on the proposed 
NYSE rule change” but not mentioning any activist activity to push this along).  
180 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (2011) (“The bylaws may provide for the reimbursement 
by the corporation of expenses incurred by a stockholder in soliciting proxies in connection 
with an election of directors, subject to such procedures or conditions as the bylaws may 
prescribe . . . .”). 
181 Georgeson lists no single proposal on reimbursement of expenses in its overview of 
2012 proposals. See GEORGESON 2012, supra note 44. Between 2003 and 2012 there were 
only 12 proposals to allow shareholders to recover proxy contest costs. See id.; GEORGESON 
2011, supra note 98; GEORGESON 2010, supra note 98; GEORGESON 2009, supra note 105; 
GEORGESON 2008, supra note 80; GEORGESON 2007, supra note 2; GEORGESON, ANNUAL 
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to our knowledge, they have not pushed for any legislative or regulatory 
actions.182 
More technical issues that cannot be neatly cast as “pro-management” or 
“pro-shareholder” and do not serve this symbolic function receive even less 
attention. The activist community has largely ignored the SEC’s “proxy 
plumbing” concept release,183 even though it addresses fundamental flaws in 
the infrastructure of shareholder voting. It is pretty difficult to rouse an 
“audience to a high pitch of indignation”184 over complications created by a 
proxy voting system combined with multiple layers of custodial ownership 
arising out of an old decision to immobilize shares rather than dematerializing 
them.185 Even technical issues like streamlining the share voting process, 
although more tightly aligned with hot button issues like “shareholder 
democracy,” fail to generate much attention. 
C. Shades of Grey 
A proper understanding of the nature of the governance debates and its 
exaggerated rhetoric should also generate some skepticism about who are the 
“good guys” and the “bad guys.” Shareholder activists, managers, and their 
defenders all have more complex motivations than maximizing firm value or 
protecting privileges. To be sure, managers are agents and are subject to 
agency costs; their interests are not perfectly aligned with the interests of 
shareholders. But shareholder activists—whether they are governance 
professionals at mutual funds, union funds or public employee pension funds, 
individual shareholders who specialize is submitting 14a-8 proposals, or 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2006), available at http://www.computershare-
na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2006.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3TK2-KPY3; 
GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2005), available at 
http://www.computershare-na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2005.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/J2LJ-3QWZ; GEORGESON 2004, supra note 2; GEORGESON, ANNUAL 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2003), available at http://www.computershare-
na.com/sharedweb/georgeson/acgr/acgr2003.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7JD3-ZM7D 
(data compiled from the preceding sources for the period 2003-2012). 
182 In some ways, the fact that activists ignored discretionary broker voting and expense 
reimbursement is odd. These issues, like others that became the focus of activist attention, 
relate to shareholder democracy. Perhaps activists viewed these issues as less sexy than the 
issue of proxy access. Perhaps they worried that success would be elusive because managers 
would spare no expense in opposition. Or, perhaps they were just too busy with the 
campaign du jour to take on another issue at the same time. 
183 See Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982 (proposed July 
22, 2010) (to be codified at 17 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 270, 274, 275) (seeking comment on the 
proxy system in order to update the rules to enhance the integrity of the shareholder vote). 
184 ARNOLD, supra note 127, at 190. 
185 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1274 (2008) (“A more-fundamental reform would entail a 
‘dematerialization,’ rather than a mere ‘immobilization,’ of securities.”). 
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academics advocating greater shareholder powers—are often imperfect agents 
as well. They frequently have economic incentives that are not aligned with 
those of shareholders at large or pursue political or ideological agendas. 
Individual shareholders who hold substantial stakes but no managerial role and 
are plausibly motivated to maximize the value of their portfolio are largely 
absent from both sides of the issues. 
Rather than epic battles between the forces of good and evil, governance 
debates thus involve disputes between different shades of grey. Neither side is 
entirely free from self-interest, and neither side has a monopoly on valid 
arguments. A symbolic victory by shareholder activists may have both positive 
and negative consequences, and the balance of consequences may differ from 
firm to firm. 
Take, for example, the wholesale shift from plurality voting to majority 
voting in large firms. While there are good arguments in favor of majority 
voting, both as a matter of principle and from a pragmatic perspective,186 we 
are not convinced that its rapid and widespread adoption among large firms 
was warranted.187 We are also not sure why firms outside the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 lag behind in their adoption of majority voting.188 Is it because the 
optimal governance regime for smaller firms differs from the one for large 
ones, because the direct benefits of majority voting in small firms are 
insufficient to warrant the cost of inducing a change, because there is less 
glamor—and lower symbolic benefits—in inducing governance changes in 
smaller firms, or is it because folklore and myths are generated around large, 
well-known companies? 
D. The Best of All Possible Worlds? 
Finally, taking the perspective of Thurman Arnold, one may observe all the 
battles and conclude that we live, if not in the best of all possible worlds, then 
at least in a pretty good one. Despite the back and forth, corporate governance 
in the United States is characterized by a high degree of stability and slow 
paced, gradual change. Because we ritually affirm the principle of shareholder 
control—maintained by the symbolic, and largely harmless, disputes discussed 
in this article—the current system of corporate governance enjoys widespread 
support. Shareholder activism, rather than undermining the legitimacy of the 
current system, serves a legitimating function showing that reform for the 
better is possible and that shareholders have power. 
In truth, however, the actual power in corporations is wielded by a small 
 
186 See supra notes 59, 65, 108 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of 
majority voting).  
187 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (arguing that there is a tradeoff between 
messages sent by plurality and majority voting). 
188 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private 
Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW 329, 343 (2010) (reporting that as of 
September 2009, only 12% of the 5,390 firms outside of the S&P 500 have majority voting). 
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number of actors who are not the beneficial holders of the equity interests. This 
number may be somewhat larger than it was in Arnold’s time, but is dominated 
by—or perhaps, it is—the Establishment. First and foremost, CEOs remain a 
dominant force, if less so than twenty years ago.189 On day-to-day matters, the 
CEO calls most of the shots, and is left to do so as long as she does a 
reasonably good job in managing the corporation. Other forces include the 
more assertive outside directors, managers of major institutional investors, 
private equity firms and activist hedge funds, and some influential outside 
professionals. These actors are involved in setting up the incentive structure for 
CEOs and occasionally get involved when there is a crisis, CEO performance 
is not satisfactory, a merger or reorganization is contemplated, or a vacancy is 
to be filled. The power of the top, say, 5,000 people in these groups, and the 
wealth beneficially owned by others that they control, are staggering. 
Waging symbolic battles, some of which may be won, may thus dull the 
public’s desire for more transformative changes. On the issues that matter, we 
are largely in equilibrium. Having created the myth of shareholder control, we 
can politically accept a system that is economically beneficial. Thurman 
Arnold—Yale Law School professor, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 
Judge of the D.C. Circuit, founder of Arnold & Porter, and indisputably a 
member of the Establishment—would smile at Vanity’s Fair, appreciating 
shareholder activism’s spectacle, glitter and performance, while at the same 
time seeking practical, non-ideological solutions to practical, non-ideological 
problems. 
CONCLUSION 
The politics of corporate governance reform shares much in common with 
politics generally. In both, there is a persistent gap between rhetoric and 
reality. In both, that gap may reflect the difficulty of change, the pursuit of a 
long-term strategy, the ignorance and confusion of participants, or the rent-
seeking by interest groups of one sort or another. However, beyond these 
conventional explanations, we should be open to the possibility that corporate 
governance politics, like politics generally, may serve a “mythological” or 
“symbolic” function separate and apart from these more instrumental and 
practical uses. 
The Folklore of Capitalism, Thurman Arnold’s cynical and ironic 
masterpiece, can serve as a useful supplement to the dominant modes of 
analysis. Focused as it ultimately is on the regulation of business, it provides a 
refreshing perspective on current controversies that, at their heart, are not so 
different from the battles over the New Deal that so energized him. Arnold’s 
analysis provides three useful takeaways. First, we ignore the “ritual” function 
of corporate governance politics and law at our peril. Second, well-meaning 
reformers who insist that we live up to our ideals can cause real harm. 
 
189 Embattled CEOs, supra note 158 (describing CEOs’ recent and gradual loss of 
power). 
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Last but not least, Arnold reminds us that, as essential as myths may be, we 
must guard against allowing them to confuse us in analyzing real world 
problems. Here, his warnings of the mischief that can be caused by taking the 
concept of “corporate personality” too seriously provide a cautionary reminder. 
It does not take much imagination to guess how Arnold would have reacted to 
the use of “corporate personality” in the line of United States Supreme Court 
cases culminating in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.190 In 
summarizing that history, the majority’s opinion stated: 
Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech does not lose 
First Amendment protection “simply because its source is a corporation.” 
Bellotti, supra, at 784,; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. 
Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8, (1986) (plurality opinion) (“The identity 
of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. 
Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 
‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that 
the First Amendment seeks to foster” (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 783)). 
The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of 
corporation or other associations should be treated differently under the 
First Amendment simply because such associations are not “natural 
persons.” Id., at 776; see id., at 780, n. 16. Cf. id., at 828 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting).191 
There are a variety of arguments that can be made for and against the 
regulation of corporate campaign expenditures, but the “corporate personality” 
of corporations is not one of them. 
 
 
190 558 U.S. 310, 342-43 (2010). 
191 Id. See also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., et al., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
(holding that a corporation is a “person” for the purposes of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act). 
